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Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most prominent methods for secure exchange
of cryptographic keys between two users. The laws of physics provide it with an immense tool
towards secure communications. Although QKD has been proven to reach distances on the order
of a few hundreds of kilometers, the transmission rate of the key significantly drops when we go
to further distances. One possible solution to this is to build a network of trusted nodes. The trust
requirement will however narrow its scope of deployability. In this thesis, we focus on improving
the key rate performance of secure communications by introducing imperfect quantum memories
(QMs) in a measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD system.
In this thesis, a protocol with the potential of beating the existing distance records for conven-
tional QKD systems is proposed. It borrows ideas from quantum repeaters by using memories in
the middle of the link, and that of MDI-QKD, which only requires optical source equipment at
the user’s end. For certain fast memories, our scheme allows a higher repetition rate than that of
quantum repeaters, thereby requiring lower coherence times. By accounting for various sources
of nonideality, such as memory decoherence, dark counts, misalignment errors, and background
noise, as well as timing issues with memories, we develop a mathematical framework within which
we can compare QKD systems with and without memories. In particular, we show that with the
state-of-the-art technology for quantum memories, it is possible to devise memory-assisted QKD
systems that, at certain distances of practical interest, outperform current QKD implementations.
To extend this work, we consider a suitable candidate that fullfils the requirements we have
set for the QMs, i.e., the ensemble-based QMs. This type of memories, nevertheless, suffers
from multiple-excitation effects, which can deteriorate the performance of the memory-assisted
MDI-QKD system. As a solution we propose an alternative approach to the memory-assisted
MDI-QKD by employing entangled-photon sources. We fully analyse this system by including
modulation errors during the state-preparation at a single-photon source. We identify under
which regimes of operation this system outperforms present QKD implementations. Overall we
obtain a realistic account of what can be done with current technologies in order to improve the
performance, in terms of rate versus distance, of QKD systems. Our findings can guide us toward
implementing larger quantum networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Communication is one of the most basic and yet most essential part of human beings in their daily
lives. It can be verbal exchange of information when discussing on a one-to-one basis or nonverbal
by using the technological advancements with the help of networks. This communication could be
extended to multiple-users all over the world. An important necessity is how to establish secure
communication between two or more parties in long distances and at the same time have high data
rates. Another is authentication where users are assured that their communicating party on the
other end is who they claim to be. The area that focuses strictly on how to establish these goals is
called cryptography. Various methods and techniques based on cryptographic systems have been
developed to protect communicating parties from adversaries. Complexity of encryption in some
algorithms is what provides the security in communication against potential eavesdroppers, thus
making the decryption more difficult. An equally interesting area of cryptography that provides
reliable security is quantum cryptography and an application therein, quantum-key-distribution
(QKD). In QKD, it is guaranteed that any eavesdropper trying to intercept the secret key can
be detected by the users. Despite the unconditional security that it offers, QKD has yet a long
way to implement efficient systems that can tolerate loss. The motivation behind my work relies
on the implementation of a trustworthy QKD system over long distances with characterised
imperfections in our employed devices. In order to describe the work behind this thesis, I will
introduce a basic background, which will be used as a guide to the main topics studied in this
thesis.
1
1.1 Cryptography
Cryptography, from the Greek words κρυpiτ o´ς , meaning secret or hidden and γραφη meaning
writing, is the primary science that studies and develops methods of encryption and decryption
of messages, as well as authentication, integrity and non-repudiation in order to establish secure
communication.
Looking at the 20th century inventions of cryptography, one of the most outstanding inventions
is the one-time-pad by Vernam [8]. The principle of this cryptographic algorithm is to translate
information, with the help of a secret key, from a plaintext to a sequence of random characters
in the alphabet, the so-called ciphertext. This symmetrical stream cipher uses a combination of
plaintext and streams of data with the same length. In the binary format, in order to generate the
ciphertext, we use the Boolean or otherwise known XOR function: plaintext⊕ key= ciphertext
=> ciphertext⊕ key= plaintext.
A key is generally used in cryptographic algorithms, for instance, in message authentication
codes and digital signature schemes. The transformation from plaintext to ciphertext is called
encryption and vice versa is the decryption. With one-time-pad the information could be trusted
to be transmitted publicly as the only person that could decode the ciphertext must have the
secret key. The Vernam cipher has the advantage of providing unconditional security against
adversaries with unlimited computational power; however, the distribution of the required key
was a complication. The significance of the security that it provides even nowadays is of great
importance and we will discuss this further in key distribution.
Another innovative invention was the Enigma [9] machine by A. Schrebious in 1918, which
was later on called the rotor machine. The rotating wired wheels could perform a challenging
substitution cipher. It was widely used during World War II. The Enigma could have up to
159× 1018 different cryptographic keys. The fact that this machine could have this enormous
numbers of possible keys is what paved the way for Alan Turing to formulate the first electronic
computer, which in turn used to decode the Enigma cipher later on. Enigma cipher messages are
decoded in a few minutes with the current computational power.
The security of Enigma and similar encryption systems is based on the mathematical com-
plexity of factorising the product of two large prime numbers. Therefore it is required to find
different cryptographic systems that their security is resilient to the advancement of technology in
computation power.
Cryptography has two main classes of cryptographic protocols, the public or asymmetric-key
cryptography and the secret or symmetric-key cryptography. In the next sections, I give a brief
description of their main advantages and weaknesses.
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1.2 Public-key cryptography
Public key cryptography or otherwise asymmetric cryptography is an invention of W. Diffie and M.
Hellman [10]. It is a method of assuring the authenticity and security of the Internet. Public key
cryptography is based on sharing initial seed keys that will be used for cryptographic protocols,
between two communicants. The user A on one end creates two different keys, hence the term
asymmetric, one is public and available to everyone and the second one is a secret key, which is
stored in a private place. If someone wishes to communicate with A then he/she has to use the
public key to encrypt his/her message and then send it to A, who can decrypt it using her private
key. This technique reassures confidentiality. Practically, the public keys are distributed through
trusted servers. The secret key can be retrieved with the help of strong computation power since
the secret and public key are mathematically related.
RSA cryptosystem was invented by Rivest, Shamir and Andleman [11] and is one of the
most widely used examples of algorithms used by public-key cryptography. It is based on the
mathematical difficulty of factoring large numbers. In RSA, A picks two large prime numbers, p
and q, and announces their product publicly. He/she chooses two large numbers k and l such that
(kl - 1) is divisible by (p-1) (q-1). The public key consists of the product N =pq together with
the number l; p, q and k make the private key. With N and l, anyone can encrypt a message M
by calculating S =Ml mod N. To decipher the encrypted message, A uses his/her private key
and calculates M= Sk mod N. Thus in order to break the RSA system, one has to find the prime
factors of N, which is a significantly hard computational problem for classical computers.
During the past decades there have been many attempts to break an RSA system [12, 13]. In a
recent attack a 768 bit key was cracked by a network of classical computers [14]. With the help of
quantum computers, the RSA system will be decrypted in polynomial order time [15]. Therefore
the RSA may become entirely outdated for its purpose. A different type of cryptography is studied
along with its benefit of the security it provides.
1.3 Secret-key cryptography
Secret-key cryptography or else known as symmetric key are algorithms that use the same
cryptographic keys to both encrypt and decrypt a message. However the distribution of the secret
key to the two parties constitutes one of the main limitations of secret key cryptography. Today,
the key distribution part is done by public-key schemes. The combination of fast secret-key and
versatile public-key systems, is at the core of today’s secure systems.
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Vernam cipher [8], as previously mentioned, is an unbreakable classical cryptographic cipher,
secure against eavesdroppers with unlimited computational and technological power. This sym-
metric cipher, uses a random key to ensure secure communication and uses the same key for both,
encrypting and decrypting a message, between two authenticated users. The encryption algorithm
E in the binary logic [16] can be written as:
EN(L) = (L1+N1,L2+N2, ...,Ln+Nn) mod 2. (1.1)
where L= (L1,L2, ..Ln) represents the message in the form of bits and N = (N1,N2, ..Nn) repre-
sents the key in the form of random bits or else the secret key bits. The decryption of the message
follows the same procedure as in equantion (1.1), on EN . When applying the mod 2 operation
two times then L can be retrieved as follows
L= EN(EN(L)) = (L1+N1+N1,L2+N2+N2, ...,Ln+Nn+Nn) mod 2. (1.2)
To establish an unbreakable secure one-time-pad system, three conditions need to be fulfilled:
(a) the key length must be equal to the length of the message; (b) the key must be random; (c) it
must be used only once (hence the one-time pad name) as it was proved by Shannon in 1949 [17]
from the information theory point of view. Even though, all of the three conditions are fulfilled,
the main limitation of the Vernam cipher, is the distribution of the key when one user is in distance
from the other. Public-key cryptography can be compromised as mentioned in Sec 1.2. However,
quantum key distribution (QKD) can be used as a solution to this problem. It offers to detect an
eavesdropper if he/she retains an unacceptable amount of information of the secret key, as it will
be explained next.
1.4 Quantum key distribution
QKD is based on the laws of quantum mechanics and it establishes a cryptosystem secure against
any attempt by adversaries to compromise the communication without the knowledge of the
two autenticated users. Protocols based on the quantum mechanics principles have unbreakable
security, unlike classical cryptography, even against an eavesdropper with unlimited computational
power. The basic principle behind QKD is the use of non-orthogonal quantum states. Its security
is based on the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which states that a measured system will be
altered if someone attempts to learn information about the non-orthogonal states with certainty
and this eavesdropper would be eventually detected. In classical physics, an eavesdropper cannot
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be traced, since the information can be encoded into any properties of a classical object and can
be accessed without changing the current state of the object [16]. Unlike the classical systems,
the quantum ones, with the usage of non-orthogonal quantum states as information carriers, can
reassure the inviolability of the channel. Since the information is encoded into non-orthogonal
states, it cannot be split, read or copied without disturbing the system in a detectable way [16].
Nonetheless QKD cannot prevent possible attempts for interception from adversaries; it only
offers the detection of any eavesdropper, namely, Eve. Any attempt of Eve to gain information
would result in discrepancies. Therefore with the help of post-processing techniques, the key is
either made secure or discarded and the two legitimate users repeat the protocol for a new key to
be generated.
There are different QKD protocols in practise. Here, I briefly explain major categories of
protocols pertinent to this thesis. Further detailed description of these protocols will appear in
Chapter 2.
1.4.1 Prepare-and-measure protocols
One of the pioneering protocols of the prepare-and-measure category is BB84 [1] (see Figure 1.1).
In prepare-and-measure protocols, one user has the encoder side and the other has the decoder. In
BB84 Alice sends a polarised single photon, encoded, in one of the two random chosen bases.
Following this, Bob measures it respectively to determine its polarization. This procedure is
repeated multiple times until they have an adequately long string of bits. In the sifting process
Bob shares his chosen basis for measurement, publicly. Thus they keep the bits that share the
same basis and discard the rest. If Eve attempts to intercept the communication, e.g. the photon
transmitted by Alice, then she will introduce discrepancies that can be detected in the generated
sifted keys.
In prepare-and-measure schemes, e.g., BB84 [1], they commonly rely on the transmission
of single photons between two parties. According to the no-cloning theorem [18] there cannot
be exact copies of an arbitrary quantum state without violating the laws of quantum mechanics.
Thus the security of any protocol using single photons is guaranteed by the no-cloning theorem
[18]. Nevertheless the implementation of single photon sources faces many difficulties. In recent
years many solutions have been proposed to overcome this drawback. One of the proposals is
to, instead of ideal single-photon sources, use weak laser pulses that emit coherent states. These
coherent states consist of vacuum components and multiphoton components, which can cause
adverse results in the performance of a QKD protocol. When the source emits more than a single
photon this leads to a compromised security as the so-called photon number splitting (PNS) attack
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Quantum Channel
Classical Channel
Alice Eve Bob
Figure 1.1: A prepare-and-measurement QKD protocol such as BB84 [1].
Alice transmits single encoded photons to Bob through a quantum channel and they both publicly
announce the bases they used. Eve represents any eavesdropper trying to intercept the
communication.
[2] (see Figure 1.2) offers Eve the possibility to obtain information of the key without being
traced. However, under certain conditions, a secure key can still be established even under the
PNS attack as proven in GLLP [19], but with a significant reduction of the secret key. In PNS,
the rate is scaled as ηch2, whereas the single photon source rate is scaled as ηch, where ηch is the
transmittance of the quantum channel.
Other solutions to the PNS attack, since the ideal single photon sources are not available, are
the modified BB84 [20] protocol where the key rate scales as ηch3/2, or using decoy state protocols
[21] where Alice randomly sends two types of pulses, one is used for extracting the key and the
other are the so called decoy states, which are used for detection of any eavesdropper. Decoy state
based protocols can be used against PNS attacks as Eve will not be able to discriminate between
the signal and decoy pulses. I will be giving a further description of this in Chapter 2.
1.4.2 Entanglement based protocols
Another category of equally important protocols is based on entanglement. Quantum entanglement
is a property that applies only in quantum physics thus a property that cannot be used in classical
physical systems. Two systems are considered entangled when their joint quantum state cannot
be described as a convex sum of separable states. The most famous QKD protocols based on
entanglement are Ekert91 [3] (see Figure 1.3) and BBM92 [22]. Assuming that the entangled
particles are photons and one of them is measured in the rectilinear basis, and has been found
to have a horizontal polarization then it is expected that the other photon will have a known
polarization, conditioned that it is measured in the same basis. However, if the second photon is
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Figure 1.2: This protocol depicts a PNS attack [2].
In the case of an imperfect single-photon source, the PNS attack takes place in a typical QKD
protocol as shown above.
measured in a different basis, e.g. circular, then it will have either right or left circular polarization.
Ekert, in his paper [3], proved that the security of a two-qubit protocol is based on Bell’s inequality
[23], an inequality which states that some correlations can be predicted by quantum mechanics
but cannot be recreated by the local hidden variable theory. John Clauser, et. al. introduced the
CHSH inequality [24], with the following classical constraints on the sum of four correlations in
Alice and Bob’s experiment:
−2≤ S≤ 2, (1.3)
where
S= E(a,b)−E(a′,b)−E(a,b′)+E(a′,b′), (1.4)
where a (b) and a′ (b′) represent detector settings on Alice and Bob’s side, respectively. The four
combinations are tested separately in experiments. The terms E(a,b) are the quantum correlations
of the particle pairs. Quantum correlation is the expectation value of the product of the “outcomes”
of the experiment. In quantum mechanics, the mathematical formalism predicts that S has a
maximum value of 2
√
2, which is greater than 2 therefore CHSH violations are confirmed by
the theory of quantum mechanics. Thus, if an adversary attempts to intercept the entangled
pairs shared by Alice and Bob, he or she will break the quantum correlation of the two particles,
resulting in a non-violation of Bell’s inequality.
While in entanglement-based QKD protocols, users do not need to trust the source, their mea-
surement devices are still prone to many attacks by Eve. This has particularly been demonstrated
experimentally by modifying the Bob’s detector setup in commercial products. These attacks
include the time-shift attack, remapping and blinding attacks [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. In these
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Entangled 
Photon 
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Figure 1.3: This protocol depicts an entanglement based protocol such as the Ekert91
[3].
An entanglement photon source placed between Alice and Bob, emits a pair of entangled photons,
one to each user through a quantum channel. As in the BB84 they discuss their measurement
results publicly.
BSM
BobEveAlice
Quantum Channel
Classical Channel
Figure 1.4: A generalised MDI-QKD protocol [4].
Alice and Bob both emit single photons through a quantum channel to the middle of their link to
perform Bell-state-measurement (BSM). The BSM module could be handled by Eve and the
secret key generated can still be secure.
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attacks, Eve exploits the flaws of the detectors to her benefit to gain information about the key.
Hence, the measurement devices, apart from being of a high value, are not necessarily reliable for
the secure operation of a QKD protocol. There is, however, a counterproposal to overcome this
limitation [31, 32] as we explain next.
1.4.3 Measurement-device-independent QKD protocols
In an alternative approach to BB84 [1] and Ekert91 [3], a different generation of protocols was
proposed, the measurement-device-independent (MDI) [4] QKD. Below there is a brief description
of this protocol.
In the MDI-QKD (see Figure 1.4) a reversed EPR-based [33] QKD security proof is combined
with BB84 source states. The main idea is that Alice and Bob would effectively share entangled
states pair in their own laboratory using the teleportation trick. A more detailed description of
MDI-QKD follows in Section 2.6.
In MDI-QKD type of protocols, the main goal is to close the gap between theory and practice
with varying degrees of success, as detection devices, which are the most prone to various attacks.
MDI-QKD has proved to be more tolerant against device inefficiencies (i.e. detection) and low
channel loss and yet provide secure keys. Additionally the MDI-QKD is resilient against side-
channel attacks on detector setups, such as the time-shift attack [34, 35], the re-mapping attack
[36] and the blinding attack [37]. Moreover, it improves the security distance over QKD protocols
that use conventional laser diodes [4].
In a practical implementation of a QKD protocol, there are various imperfections, such as
the detection efficiency, dark counts in photodetectors, imperfect sources and channel loss. All
these inefficiencies contribute to a constrained performance of a QKD protocol. This is usually
measured by the corresponding rate at which the two users can establish a secret key, i.e. the
secret key generation rate. In this thesis, I use the secret key generation rate as the main figure of
merit for comparing the performance of different systems considered here.
Despite all commercial and experimental achievements in QKD [38, 39, 40, 41, 42], reaching
arbitrarily long distances is still a remote objective. Because QKD relies on single photons to
generate secret keys, this would impose numerous problems when long-distance communications
is concerned. Limitations such as the channel loss restricts the distance of communications
significantly. The fundamental solution to this problem, i.e., quantum repeaters, that is is known
for over a decade. From early proposals by Briegel et al. [43] to the latest no-memory version by
Munro et al. [44], quantum repeaters, typically rely on highly efficient quantum gates comparable
to what we may need for future quantum computers. While the progress on that ground may
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take some time before such systems become functional, another approach based on probabilistic
gate operations was proposed by Duan and coworkers [45], which could offer a simpler way of
implementing quantum repeaters for moderate distances of up to around 1000 km. The latter
systems require quantum memory modules with high coupling efficiencies to light and with
coherence times exceeding the transmission delays, which are yet to be achieved together. In this
thesis, we propose a protocol that, although is not as scalable as quantum repeaters, for certain
classes of memories, to some extent, relaxes, the harsh requirements on memories’ coherence
times, thereby paving the way for the existing technologies to beat the highest distance records
achieved for no-memory QKD links [38]. The idea behind our protocol was presented in [46], and,
independently, it has also been used in [47]. This thesis proposes additional practical schemes and
rigorously analyzes them under realistic conditions.
Our protocol relies on concepts from quantum repeaters, on the one hand and MDI-QKD
on the other. The original MDI-QKD [4] relies on sending encoded photons by the users to a
middle site at which a Bell-state measurement (BSM) is performed. This BSM can be done by an
untrusted party, e.g., the service provider, which makes MDI-QKD resilient to detector attacks,
e.g., time-shift, remapping, and blinding attacks [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. The security is then
guaranteed by the reverse EPR protocol [33]. In our scheme, by using two quantum memories at
the middle site, we first store the state of the transmitted photons in the memories, and perform
the required BSM, only when both memories are loaded. This way, similar to quantum repeaters,
we achieve a rate-versus-distance improvement as compared to the MDI-QKD schemes proposed
in [4, 48], or other conventional QKD systems that do not use quantum memories.
There is an important distinction between our protocol and a conventional quantum repeater
system. In a typical quantum repeater link, which relies on initial entanglement distribution
among neighboring nodes, the repeat period for the protocol is mainly dictated by the transmission
delay for the shortest segment of the repeater system [49, 50]. In our scheme, however, the repeat
period is constrained by the writing time, including the time needed for the herald/verification
process, into memories. This implies that using sufficiently fast memories, one can run our
scheme at a faster rate than that of a quantum repeater, thereby achieving higher key generation
rates, as compared to conventional QKD links, and at lower coherence times, as compared to
probabilistic repeater systems. This increase in clock rate is what our proposal shares with the
recently proposed third generation of quantum repeaters, which use quantum error correction
codes to compensate for loss and errors, thus also being able to speed up the clock rate to local
processing times [44]. The need for long coherence times remains one of the key challenges in
implementing the first generations of quantum repeaters before the latest no-memory quantum
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repeater proposals can be implemented.
The above two benefits would offer a midterm solution to the problem of long-distance QKD.
While our scheme is not scalable the same way that quantum repeaters are, it possibly allows us to
use the existing technology for quantum memories to improve the performance of QKD systems.
In the absence of fully operational quantum repeater systems, our setup can fill the gap between
theory and practice and will become one of the first applications of realistic quantum memories in
quantum communications.
It is worth mentioning that the setups we propose here are compatible with different generations
of hybrid quantum-classical (HQC) networks [51]. In such systems, home users are not only able
to use broadband data services, but they can also use quantum services such as QKD. MDI-QKD
offers a user-friendly approach to the access part of such networks as the end users only require
source equipment. Whereas, in the first generation of HQC networks, the service provider may
only facilitate routing services for quantum applications, in the future generations, probabilistic,
deterministic, and eventually no-memory quantum repeaters constitute the quantum core of the
network. In each of these cases, our setups are extensible and compatible with forthcoming
technologies for HQC networks.
1.5 Thesis overview and outline
In this thesis, I will depict examples of how we can use the idea of MDI-QKD with quantum
memories (QMs) to achieve longer distances. Memory-assisted MDI-QKD requires milder
conditions on memory devices thus making this protocol more feasible in the short term. In order
to analyze this protocol, the inefficiencies of each module has to be taken into consideration. The
reason is that these inefficiencies can affect the performance of the protocol itself, represented
by its key generation rate. These inefficiencies include the channel loss, the detector efficiency,
dark counts and decoherence in QMs. There will be an analytical explanation on how the key
generation rate versus distance is obtained in each case. I will find the secret key rate as a function
of many system parameters, for comparison on how the system is affected in each case. The thesis
is structured as follows:
• In Chapter 2, I will review the relevant background including QKD protocols.
• In Chapter 3, I will analyse the performance of MDI-QKD, using single-photon sources
that include modulation errors. I will show how the performance of the MDI-QKD protocol
is affected by such errors.
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• In Chapter 4, I will study how the addition of QMs in the MDI-QKD improves the key
generation rate versus distance. By considering many sources of imperfection for the QMs
I will set a specific set of requirements that need to attain in order for the memory-assisted
MDI-QKD to outperform other conventional no-memory QKD systems.
• In Chapter 5, I will extend my analysis by considering a memory-assisted MDI-QKD with
imperfect EPR sources. This protocol offers the ability to use a wider range of QMs that do
not necessarily herald the storage of a photon.
• In Chapter 6, I will summarise my work and present a few topics for future research.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
This Chapter gives a brief description of what is necessary to have as a background in order
to understand the technical contribution of this thesis. This includes the review of a few QKD
protocols relevant to the topics discussed in this thesis. I will begin with the primary prepare-and-
measure protocol, BB84 [1], and that of enanglement-based, the Ekert protocol [3] for exchanging
secret keys. I will continue with the decoy-state method, which allows for usage of weak laser
pulses instead of ideal single photons in QKD. I will compare these main QKD protocols in terms
of their secret key generation rates. Also I describe the original MDI-QKD [4], which is at the
core of our work.
2.2 BB84 protocol
The benchmark of QKD is the well known BB84 [1], which was proposed by Charles Bennet
and Gilles Brassard in 1984. BB84 protocol is based on the exchange of secret information with
the use of non-orthogonal states. In this protocol, Alice is the sender and Bob is the receiver and
they wish to communicate through a quantum channel, e.g., an optical fibre or free space. An
authenticated public channel is also required. In BB84 Alice transmits a key bit by encoding a
single photon in one of the four polarisation states. In doing so she chooses randomly between
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one of the two conjugate bases, namely, the rectilinear and diagonal. She assigns bit 0 to the
horizontally (or 450) polarised photons and bit 1 to vertical (or −450) polarisation. Eve cannot
tell with certainty to which photons Alice has assigned bit 0 or bit 1. At the receiver, Bob also
chooses one of the bases randomly and performs a polarisation measurement. After this, through
an authenticated public channel, Alice and Bob announce to each other the choice of their bases
for each bit of the key they measured. They both discard all key bits for which their bases do
not agree, which could be around half of the message as seen in Figure 2.1. This procedure is
called sifting. The post-processing procedure, i.e., the error correction and privacy amplification,
is the next step in order to remove all the discrepancies in their keys and reduce any information
that might be in Eve’s knowledge. If there is an eavesdropper, then the percentage of the correct
key bits drops to less than a certain threshold in which case they abort the protocol and try again.
The discrepancy rate between the sifted keys of Alice and Bob is called quantum bit error rate
(QBER). If the QBER is below a certain level, (between 11% [52] and 20% [53]) privacy am-
plification can be used to reduce Eve’s knowledge of the key at the price of reducing the key length.
Alice’s key bit 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Alice’s basis
x + + x x + + x
Alice photon sent ↖ → ↑ ↗ ↗ → → ↖
Bob’s measurement
basis x x + x + + x +
Photon polarization 
measured by Bob
↖ random ↑ ↗ random → random random
Public Discussion
Secret Key 1 1 0 0
Figure 2.1: Schematic description of the BB84 protocol.
Alice transmits randomly generated key bits. She chooses randomly between rectilinear and
diagonal bases, to send a single photon. Bob measures all the photons after he received them from
Alice, choosing randomly between the same two polarisation bases. After this, through an
authenticated public channel, Alice and Bob announce to each other the choice of their bases for
each bit of the key they measured. That would result in a sifted key shared between Alice and Bob.
As mentioned earlier, the security of the BB84 protocol relies primarily on the use of single
photons due to the no cloning theorem [18]. Alice requires an ideal single photon source to
transmit her information to Bob. Nonetheless the implementation of perfect single photon sources
is currently practically impossible. Usually the single-photon sources produce multiphoton
components, thus making them susceptible to eavesdropping attacks such as the photon-number-
splitting (PNS) attack [2]. In the PNS attack, if there are more than one photon transmitted
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through the pulse in the channel, Eve can split off the extra photons and transmit the remaining
single photons to Bob. Eve can therefore store with the help of a QM these extra photons and
she measures it in the correct basis once Bob measures his and Alice announces her chosen basis
publicly. In this way Eve can gain part of the information on the secret key thus compromising
the security of the protocol. In the followng section, I will describe a solution to the PNS attack
with the use of weak laser pulses instead of single photons in QKD.
2.3 Decoy-state method
The decoy-state [21] is proposed as a solution to minimise the effects of the security loophole for
attacks such as the PNS in the BB84 protocol if the quantum information carriers are composed
of multiphoton components. The use of lasers to send pulses of weak coherent states, to substitute
single photons, makes the protocol more employable for a practical application. A weak coherent
state source consists of multiphoton components, which will be explained below. In the decoy-
state method [21], Alice sends two types of states: the signal states, for the key generation only,
and, the decoy states, for detecting the presence of any eavesdropper. In the combination of the
decoy state with the BB84, Alice chooses to send Bob the signal states and the decoy states with
different intensities. We consider that Yi known as the yield, is the conditional probability of a
detection on Bob’s side, conditioned that Alice sends i photons. More specifically the yield of the
i-photon states Yi mainly comes from two parts, the background and the true signal. Assuming
that the background counts Y0 are independent of the signal photon detection, then Yi is given by:
Yi = Y0+ηi−Y0ηi (2.1)
Because Eve cannot discriminate between the signal and decoy states to extract the key, we
have that the yield Yi and QBER ei of i−photon states is given respectively by
Yi(decoy) = Yi(signal),
ei(decoy) = ei(signal). (2.2)
In order to estimate Yi and ei terms by legitimate users, we can assume that an infinite number
of decoy states are sent. For all pulses with intensity µ we have the overall gain Qµ and the overall
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intrinsic error rate due to background noise of µ photon states is EµQµ given by
Qµ =
∞
∑
i=0
Qi, (2.3)
and
EµQµ =
∞
∑
i=0
eiYi
µ i
i!
exp(−µ), (2.4)
where Qi is the gain of i−photon states given by:
Qµ = Yi
µ i
i!
exp(−µ). (2.5)
If there are infinitely many intensities, then theoretically we can estimate the overall gain and
QBER for the single photons Q1 and e1 with a good precision. It is proven that the least required
amount of decoy states that can be used in practice is one or two [54]. According to the infinite
decoy-state QKD protocol [55] the basic steps are:
• Alice transmits signal and decoy states to Bob, who in turn measures them in the two
conjugate bases.
• Alice announces publicly the pulses she used for decoy states and they determine all the
gains of signals and of decoy states.
• Alice and Bob compare all the bases used for the decoy states in order to find the QBER.
• Error correction and privacy amplification follows, in order to find the final secret key
generated.
The key rate formula for the decoy-state procotol in the BB84 technique is derived by Lo et.
al. from [56]. For infinitely many decoy states and long keys, the key rate has a lower bound
given by:
R≥ q[Q1[1−h(e1)]−Qµ f h(Eµ)], (2.6)
where q is the basis reconciliation factor, f is the error correction inefficiency, and the binary
entropy function h(x) =−x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x). The error correction inefficiency denotes
the inenefficiency of the error correction scheme, i.e., the ratio between the actual cost of error
correction and its minimum value obtained by the Shannon’s theorem, assumed to be constant
and equal to f = 1.16. Eµ is the overall QBER for coherent photon states with µ average photon
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number. In the case of the BB84 scheme the reconciliation factor equals to 1/2 due to the fact that
half of the time Alice and Bob do not agree on the chosen basis. In Equation (2.6), we can assume
q= 1 if the efficient [57] QKD scheme is used. The key rate formula of Equation (2.6) with q= 1
will be further used in Chapter 4. In the following subsection (2.4) I give a brief mathematical
analysis for the key generation rate of the BB84 protocol.
2.4 BB84 Key Rate analysis
In this section we summarize the secret key generation rate for the efficient BB84 protocol
[57] shown in Figure (2.2). In Figure (2.2), Alice is the transmitter sending pulses in either
the rectilinear or diagonal basis and Bob is the receiver, which decodes the message. They
communicate through an optical channel of distance L.
BB84
QM QM
BB84
BSMBSM BSMEncoder Encoder
LBLAAlice Bob
QM: Quantum Memory
BSM: Bell-state Measurement
BB84 BB84
Encoder
LAlice
Meas.
Bob
Figure 2.2: The setup for the BB84 protocol.
With a clock rate of RS, the secret key generation rate is lower bounded by
RBB84 = RSY1[1−h(e1)− f h(e1)], (2.7)
in the single-photon case, and
RBB84 = RS[Q1(1−h(e1))− fQµh(Eµ)], (2.8)
in the (infinitely many) decoy-state case, where µ is the average number of photons for the
signal state, which is dominantly used. In Equation (2.7), Y1 is the yield of single photons, or the
probability that Bob gets a click on his measurement devices assuming that Alice has sent exactly
one photon, including the dark counts and is given by
Y1 = YC+YE = 1− (1−η)(1− pdc)2, (2.9)
where η = ηch(L)ηd , with nch(L) = exp(−L/Latt) being the loss or a channel with attenuation
length Latt, ηd being the detector efficiency, and pdc is the dark count rate per pulse. In Equa-
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tion (2.9)
YC = (1− pdc/2)(η+(1−η)pdc) and YE = pdc[(1−η)(1− pdc/2)+η/2] (2.10)
correspond, respectively, to the terms that, in the absence of misalignment, result in identical
(Correct) versus non-identical (Error) bits shared by Alice and Bob. The QBER for the single
photon case, e1, is the same for both bases and is given by
e1 =
YE
Y1
(2.11)
and the overall intrinsic error rate is given by
e1Y1 = edYC+(1− ed)YE = e0Y1− (e0− ed)(YC−YE)
= e0Y1− (e0− ed)η(1− pdc), (2.12)
where e0 = 1/2 and ed is the total misalignment probability for the channel.
Similarly, in Equation (2.8),
Q1 = Y1µe−µ ,
Qµ = QC+QE = 1− e−ηµ(1− pdc)2,
QC = (1− pdc/2)(1− e−ηµ + e−ηµ pdc),
QE = pdc[e−ηµ(1− pdc/2)+(1− e−ηµ)/2], (2.13)
are the corresponding gain terms [56] for the overall gain of single photon states Q1, of all pulses
with intensity µ Qµ , and the overall error probability QE . The overall intrinsic error rate is given
by
EµQµ = e0Qµ − (e0− ed)(1− e−ηµ)(1− pdc), (2.14)
e0 = 1/2,
and the overall QBER Eµ is given by
Eµ =
QE
Qµ
. (2.15)
The decoy-state technique can be used when the signals are driven by the users. In the
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following section, a different approach to exchanging secret keys is proposed, where the decoy-
state method cannot be applied. Despite this, the next approach has an equal importance as the
BB84 for the QKD.
2.5 Ekert protocol
An alternative approach to BB84 was introduced by Ekert in 1991, using entangled photon pairs
[3]. This protocol relies on three properties of quantum entanglement. First is the fact that
entangled states are perfectly correlated, second is the quantum non-locality and the last is the
detection of eavesdroppers, whose attempts destroy these correlations.
Unlike the BB84, Alice and Bob in the Ekert protocol are now both receivers, connected to a
central source that creates entangled photons sending one to Alice and one to Bob. The source
could be untrusted (Eve could handle it) but the protocol is set in a way that the source emits pairs
of polarisation singlet states [58] as
|φ〉= 1√
2
(| ↑↓〉− | ↓↑〉). (2.16)
Next Alice and Bob choose one out of the three coplanar axes for a polarization measurement.
Alice’s and Bob’s orientation analyzers represent a basis and are given accordingly by:
φA = 0◦,45◦,90◦ (2.17)
and
φB = 45◦,90◦,135◦. (2.18)
If their bases match then their results will be anti-correlated. For instance if Alice measures
vertical polarization then Bob will measure horizontal polarization and vice versa. If they choose
different bases, then the results will be random.
Public discussion follows to exchange the bases that Bob and Alice chose. They discard
the random results in order to establish the sifted key. For the results that match to prove their
entanglement they must violate the Bell inequality [23]. One key feature of this protocol is its
immunity against source attacks. If Eve tries to manipulate the source to her own advantage, she
introduces errors, detectable by Alice and Bob, whose data will now be uncorrelated. In such a
case Alice and Bob acknowledge Eve’s presence and abort the protocol.
Many protocols succeeded the Ekert protocol relying on the security that entangled states
provide. An example of these protocols is the BBM92 [22] that was proposed by Bennett, Brassard
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and Mermin and it is an entanglement-based form of the BB84 protocol. More proposed protocols
that share the same idea was the time-reversed EPR protocol [32, 33] and the device-independent
one [59]. The modified BB84 with entangled photons has been experiementally constructed [60].
The main drawbacks that both prepare-and-measure protocols and entanglement-based proto-
cols face are the multiple attacks that can be performed on the measurement devices [61]. These
attacks significantly reduce the security of the protocol itself. As an alternative to prepare-and-
measure and entanglement-based protocols, measurement-device-independent (MDI-QKD) was
proposed by Lo, Curty and Qi [4]. In the proposed protocol the measurement devices could be in
the hands of untrusted parties. It relies on entanglement swapping and the time-reverse EPR [33]
protocol. The decoy-state protocol can also be used giving it another benefit. In the next section,
the key features of this protocol are described.
2.6 MDI-QKD protocol
In MDI-QKD [4] a reverse EPR-based QKD security proof [33] is combined with the BB84
source states to remove all the side-channel attacks in detectors automatically. Additionally in the
current protocol, the decoy-state technique, which was described in Section 2.3, can be applied,
using weak coherent pulses (WCPs) that are generated by a laser, as a source. The main idea
is that Alice and Bob would effectively share entangled states in their own laboratory using the
teleportation trick.
Figure 2.3 shows the setup. Alice and Bob prepare photons in one of the four possible BB84
polarisation states and in the measurement site a Bell state measurement is performed. The
measurement device consists of linear optical elements as seen in Figure 2.3 with a 50−50 beam
splitter (BS), which on each end has a polarising beam splitter (PBS), and on each of the PBS
output arms there is a single-photon detector. The measurement device is on the hands of an
untrusted party called Eve. Eve announces which detectors click. The procedure is repeated
several times by Alice and Bob. After the bases that were chosen are publicly announced through
a public channel, Alice and Bob compare their results and discard the ones that their bases do not
match and use the rest for key generation after error correction and privacy amplification. The
security of the MDI-QKD relies on the time-reverse EPR protocol, therefore the measurement
device module does not need to be trusted.
MDI-QKD offers several advantages over other QKD schemes. It removes all the side-channel
attacks in detectors automatically since all the measurements can be done by Eve [33]. This is a
benefit over the standard BB84 [1] and Ekert [3] protocols, where either Alice or Bob, or both
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Figure 2.3: The MDI-QKD set up [4]
The main idea is that Alice and Bob send either single photons or phase-randomized weak
coherent pulses in one of the four possible BB84 polarisation states [1] and send them to an
untrusted relay (Eve) placed in the middle. This relay setup performs partial BSM. On each end
of the 50−50 beam splitter (BS), there are two polarising beam splitters (PBS) that on each arm
have a single-photon detector. A successful BSM associates with two clicks and identifies two of
the four Bell states.
parties must perform some measurements. The transmission distance in MDI-QKD could reach
almost double the distance used in conventional BB84 setups. Also the key generation rate is as
good as the ones that use entangled photon pairs. Additionally MDI-QKD does not require a near
unity detection efficiency, but, using post-selection, unsuccessful BSMs can be removed without
compromising the security. To summarise, MDI-QKD is attractive for practical implementation
and fully effective against any side channel attacks on detectors. An analysis of the key rate of
MDI-QKD follows next.
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Figure 2.4: The MDI-QKD using two single-photon source encoders.
2.6.1 MDI-QKD key rate analysis
The secret key generation rate for the MDI-QKD scheme of Figure 2.4 is lower bounded by [48]
RMDI−QKD = RSY11[1−h(e11;X)− f h(e11;Z)], (2.19)
in the single-photon case, where Y11 is the conditional probability of successful middle BSM
conditioned that Alice and Bob have sent exactly a single photon at the beginning using the same
basis, RS is the single photon repetition rate. The QBER in X and Z basis are given by e11;X and
e11;Z when Alice and Bob use exactly single photons.
RMDI−QKD = RS[Q11(1−h(e11;X))− fQµν ;Zh(Eµν ;Z)], (2.20)
in the decoy-state case, where µ (ν) is the average number of photons for signal states sent by
Alice (Bob). The QBER in the Z basis becomes Eµν ;Z when using µ (ν) as the average number
of photons for signal states instead of single photons. Here, Q11 is the overall probability of a
successful BSM if Alice and Bob, respectively, send pulses with µ and ν average number of
photons and is given by
Q11(ηa,ηb) = µνe−µ−νY11(ηa,ηb) (2.21)
where ηa = ηch(LA)ηd and ηb = ηch(LB)ηd are transmission coefficients of each leg with lengths,
LA and LB, respectively in Figure 2.4, and [48]
Y11(ηa,ηb) = (1− pdc)2
[ηaηb
2 +(2ηa+2ηb−3ηaηb)pdc+4(1−ηa)(1−ηb)p2dc
]
,
e11;X(ηa,ηb,ed)Y11(ηa,ηb) = e0Y11(ηa,ηb)− (e0− ed)(1− pdc)2ηaηb/2,
e11;Z(ηa,ηb,ed)Y11(ηa,ηb) = e0Y11(ηa,ηb)− (e0− ed)(1− pdc)2(1−2pdc)ηaηb/2
(2.22)
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with ed being the total misalignment probability. In the scheme of Figure 2.4, ed = edA(1−edB)+
edB(1− edA), where edA(edB) is the misalignment parameter for Alice (Bob) channel.
Similarly, using the results obtained in [48], we have
Qµν ;Z = Q′C+Q
′
E
Eµν ;ZQµν ;Z = edQ′C+(1− ed)Q′E , (2.23)
where
Q′C = 2(1− pdc)2e−µ
′/2
[
1− (1− pdc)e−ηaµa/2
][
1− (1− pdc)e−ηbµb/2
]
Q′E = 2pdc(1− pdc)2e−µ
′/2[I0(2x)− (1− pdc)e−µ ′/2]. (2.24)
In the above Equations, I0(x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind and
x =
√ηaµηbν/2, (2.25)
y = (1− pdc)e− 14 (ηaµ+ηbν), (2.26)
µ ′ = ηaµ+ηbν . (2.27)
2.7 Memory-assisted MDI-QKD
In this thesis, we extend the idea of an MDI-QKD protocol, to achieve longer distances, with the
use of QMs. QMs can be located next to the BSM module in order to reduce the effect of channel
loss on the key rate. The key advantage of our proposed memory-assisted MDI-QKD as compared
to the original MDI-QKD, is its higher resilience to channel loss and dark count.
In our protocol, Alice and Bob, at a rate RS, send BB84 encoded pulses to the middle station
(dashed box in Figure (2.5)). At the QMs, for each incoming pulse, we either apply a loading
process by which we can store the state of the photons into memories and verify it, or use the
indirectly heralding scheme of Figure (2.5(b)). Once successful for a particular QM, we stop the
loading procedure on that QM, and wait until both memories are loaded, at which point, a BSM is
performed on the QMs. The BSM results are sent back to Alice and Bob, and the above procedure
is being repeated until a sufficient number of raw key bits is obtained. The rest of the protocol is
the same as that of MDI-QKD. Sifting and postprocessing will be performed on the raw key to
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Figure 2.5: (a) MDI-QKD with directly heralding quantum memories. Alice and Bob
use the efficient BB84 protocol to encode and send pulses to their respective QM in
the middle of the link. At each round, each QM attempts to store the incoming pulse.
Once they are both loaded, we retrieve the QMs’ states and perform a BSM on the
resulting photons. (b) MDI-QKD with indirectly heralding quantum memories. At
each round, an entangling process is applied to each QM, which would generate a
photon entangled, in polarization, with the QM. These photons interfere at the BSM
modules next to the QMs with incoming pulses from the encoders. As soon as one of
these BSMs succeeds, we stop the entangling process on the corresponding QM, and
wait until both QMs are ready for the middle BSM operation. In this case, QMs are
not required to be heralding; a trigger event is declared by the success of the BSM
located between the QM and the respective encoder. (c) The original MDI-QKD
protocol [4].
obtain a secret key. In this thesis, we neglect the finite-size-key effects in our analysis [62].
In the no-memory MDI-QKD case, the condition set for a successful BSM, is that both pulses
must survive the path loss. Therefore, the key generation rate scales with the loss in the entire
channel. In our scheme, each pulse, still requires that it will survive the path loss over half of
the link, but this can happen in different rounds for the signal sent by Alice as compared to that
of Bob. We essentially achieve the quantum repeater benefit in that the key generation rate, in
the symmetric case, scales with the loss over half of the total distance. Moreover, in the case of
directly heralding memories, our scheme is roughly immune against dark counts [47]. This is
because the measurement efficiency in the BSM module is typically a few orders of magnitude
higher than that of dark count rates. Dark counts will then only sightly add to the error rate. In our
scheme, memory decoherence errors play a major role as we will explain in detail in Chapter 4.
Moreover, we study what are the writing times of these two different type of QMs. The writing
time is a crucial parameter that defines the performance of the key rate versus distance. More
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specifically, writing time, in the directly heralding QMs, denotes the time difference between the
time that a pulse arrives at the QM and the time that a successful/unsuccessful loading is denoted.
The writing time for the indirectly heralding QMs, denotes the difference between the entangling
process and BSM operation.
Another important parameter we take into consideration is the QM’s coherence or dephasing
time (T2). This parameter directly affects the key rate versus distance as well.
As we explain in detail in Chapter 4, for high values of coherence times and short writing
times, we prove that a memory-assisted system with suitable QM candidates, can outperform, in
terms of key rate conventional no-memory QKD systems.
2.8 The main contributions of this thesis
In Chapter 1, we introduced the key features of QKD and the challenges it deals for a realistic
implementation. In this thesis, we work on the following challenges to find possible solutions that
can improve the performance of the system. These problems and our proposed solutions are given
below:
Problem: QKD offers unconditional security based on the laws of quantum physics, however
the practical implementation of specific QKD systems is prone from possible attacks that can be
performed on the measurement parts of the system, if controlled by the users. MDI-QKD offers
an alternative solution to overcome this limitation. Therefore the modeling of such a system has
to be studied in full to check:
1. how it performs in a practical scenario, when, for instance, sources are imperfect in the
sense that there are errors in the state-preparation stage; and
2. how can quantum memories improve the performance of an MDI-QKD system regarding
its distance and rate and what requirements they must fullfil in order to achieve the highest
possible performance.
Our contribution: In Chapter 3, we analyse a typical MDI-QKD system that uses single-
photon sources but with potential modulation errors. We give a detailed description of how the
key rate is affected by these errors, which allows us to identify the regimes of operation. We will
show that MDI-QKD can still perform efficienctly under certain assumptions on the fidelity of
each single-photon state.
Our contribution: In Chapter 4, we fully analyse an MDI-QKD system with imperfect QMs,
where we analytically compute the secret key rate. QMs are of great importance when it comes
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to reach longer distances as it proven by the results. We find regimes of operation where our
proposed system performs better than conventional QKD systems. The results are promising for
near-future practical implementations.
Problem: The memory-assisted MDI-QKD needs to relax the constraints on the QMs to enable
the use of a larger number of the avalaible QMs.
Our contribution: In Chapter 5 an alternative approach to the memory-assissted MDI-QKD
is to use QMs that are indirectly heralding. We combine the memory-assisted MDI-QKD setup
with entangled photon-pair sources. As we consider a realistic scenario we combine the idea of
EPR sources being imperfect by including modulation errors. A full analysis to retrieve the key is
provided and a comparison to the previous case is made. We show that this system allows us to
still have a fully functional and efficienct system under certain assumptions.
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Chapter 3
MDI-QKD with imperfect encoders
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we focus on the state-preparation (modulation) flaws in the single-photon sources
in an MDI-QKD setup. In the key rate analysis presented in Chapter 2, it was assumed that each
source will generate the exact BB84 states as required. In a practical setup, this may not be a
realistic assumption for the source. The key objective is to establish an employable MDI-QKD
protocol that remains secure under the assumption of both imperfect single-photon sources and
imperfect measurement devices. The main goal in this chapter is to calculate the key generation
rate versus distance for single-photon sources with state-preparation imperfections. During the
preparation of this thesis, a similar work has been reported by Lo et al. [63]. The work presented
here has been obtained independently, and goes beyond the results presented in [63].
An ideal BB84 encoder has two properties. The first is that the source emits ideal single
photons and the second is that the information is encoded without errors. However, these two
assumptions can hardly be fulfilled with the current technology. Even single-photon sources that
generate exactly one photon may produce a different polarisation from the initially intended state
during the encoding process. This type of error is referred to as modulation errors. To address this
issue, in this chapter, we consider imperfect encoders, as shown in Figure 3.1. The main objective
is to analyse how the performance of this practical scenario would be affected when modulation
errors are accounted for. We point out that this analysis is a preliminary step for Chapter 5, where
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imperfect EPR sources are used in a memory-assisted MDI-QKD.
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Figure 3.1: Asymmetric setup with imperfect BB84 encoders in an MDI-QKD scheme.
3.2 This chapter’s contribution
• We analyse the MDI QKD system when the sources of each user are prone to modulation
errors at the state-preparation stage. We fully analyse how to obtain the key rate and QBER
formulas in this scenario.
• We consider different initial states of the single-photon source for each user. Firstly we
assume that both users have imperfect single-photon sources that have a mixture of two
single-photon states in a symmetric setup, where both users are at equal distance from the
middle measurement module. We compare the key rate and QBER against the ideal case.
• In the second case, we consider that only one user has an imperfect single-photon source,
whereas the other one has an ideal one. The reason is that we will be using an analogous
case in Chapter 5.
• Lastly, we compare the case where the single-photon states can tolerate more imperfections
by including cross-terms in our initial density matrix.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.3 analyses the MDI-QKD with imperfect
single-photon sources. In Section 3.4, an analysis of the key rate is provided. In Section 3.5 the
results are summarised for different setups and fidelities and we conclude in Section 3.6.
3.3 System description
In this chapter, we assume that Alice and Bob are equipped with single-photon sources that
generate qubit states but not necessarily in the desired polarised BB84 state. Alice and Bob follow
the same procedure as described in Section 2.6 for a typical MDI-QKD with the difference that the
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single-photon sources are assumed imperfect (see Figure 3.1). The outcome of such an imperfect
encoder, for user x= A,B, is modeled by the following density matrix:
ρ(m)x;K = α
(m)
x;K |H〉〈H|+β (m)x;K |H〉〈V |+β (m)∗x;K |V 〉〈H|+ γ(m)x;K |V 〉〈V |, (3.1)
where m= {0,1} represents the transmitted bit in basis K = {X ,Z}. |H〉 and |V 〉 are two of the
four BB84 polarised states in horizontal and vertical polarizations. α(m)x;K , β
(m)
x;K , β
(m)∗
x;K and γ
(m)
x;K are
the probabilities respectively for the BB84 polarised states respectively |H〉〈H|, |H〉〈V |, |V 〉〈H|
and |V 〉〈V |. According to the normalization fo the density matrix the diagonal elements must
obey the following condition α(m)x;K + γ
(m)
x;K = 1. We use the same notation as in Chapter 2 for other
system parameters. In particular, the distance between Alice (Bob) and the measurement module
is denoted by LA (LB). The total distance between Alice and Bob is denoted by L= LA+LB. The
transmission coefficient for a channel with length l is given by
ηch(l)≡ exp(−l/Latt), (3.2)
where Latt is the attenuation length of the channel (roughly, 22 km for 0.2 dB/km of loss).
Next we obtain the secret key generation rate for the scheme of Figure 3.1, when input states
are given by Equation (3.1). Suppose Alice is sending bit m and Bob is sending bit n, in basis K.
Their joint input state is then given by
ρ(mn)AB;K = ρ
(m)
A;K⊗ρ(n)B;K. (3.3)
In the following we model what happens to the initial state ρ(m)A;K and ρ
(n)
B;K once the corre-
sponding photons travel through the setup of Figure 3.2. We model the path loss and detector
efficiencies by beams splitters (BSs), as showing in Figure 3.2, the transmission coefficients
ηch(LA), ηch(LB), and ηd . Their combined effect can then be represented by two beam splitters
with transmission coefficients ηα = ηch(LA)ηd , for Alice’s side, and ηβ = ηch(LB)ηd , for Bob’s
leg. If we represent the quantum operator by a beam splitter with transmissivity η by Bη , the
joing state right before the 50−50 BS is given by
ρ(mn)
′
AB;K = trV (BηαBηβ (ρ
(mn)
AB;K)B
†
ηβB
†
ηα ), (3.4)
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Figure 3.2: Modeling of the channel loss and detection efficiency in the BSM module.
where
Bη |P〉|0〉=
√
n|P〉〈0|+√1−n|0〉〈P|, (3.5)
and P= {H,V} denotes a photon in one of the polarised BB84 states and tracing is done over all
vacuum modes entering the BSs in Figure 3.2(b).
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Figure 3.3: Bell-state measurement module for polarization states.
Next in order to model the BSM operation (see Figure 3.3), we apply the butterfly operator
BBF that includes the operation of both the BS and Polarising BS (PBS) (see Appendix C). With
the help of MATLAB, we apply the butterfly operator BBF on ρ
(mn)′
AB;K . The density matrix right
before photodetection, ρ(out)AB , in Figure 3.3, is then given by
ρ(out)AB = BBF(ρ
(mn)′
AB;K )B
†
BF . (3.6)
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Having calculated the output state, an analysis of the key rate will follow in the next section.
3.4 Key rate analysis
In this section we obtain the parameters needed to calculate the key rate in the case of imperfect
single-photon sources. We start with the output state in Equation (3.6). One needs to apply the
measurement operators MDiD j to find all possibilities of a successful BSM. More specifically, the
probability that detectors i and j, where i, j = H1,V1,H2,V2 in Figure 3.3 click is given by
PDiD j(ρ
(m)
A;K⊗ρ(n)B;K) = tr(ρ(out)AB MDiD j), (3.7)
where measurement operators are defined by
MDiD j = (1− pdc)2[Ii− (1− pdc)|0〉ii〈0|] (3.8)
⊗[I j− (1− pdc)|0〉 j j〈0|]
⊗|0〉kk〈0|
⊗|0〉ll〈0|,
where i, j are the corresponding detectors that click, whereas k, l are the single-photon detectors
in Figure 3.3, that do not click, I is the identity operator and pdc is the dark count probability.
The probability that an acceptable click pattern occurs in the K basis, similar to Section 2.6.1 is
defined as
QKAB = Q
K
C +Q
K
E , K = X ,Z, (3.9)
where
QKAB =
1
4 ∑m=0,1
QAB(ρ
(m)
A;K⊗ρ(n)B;K), (3.10)
and more analytically is given by
QKAB(ρ
(m)
A;K⊗ρ(n)B;K) = PDH1V1 (ρ
(m)
A;K⊗ρ(n)B;K)+PDH1V2 (ρ
(m)
A;K⊗ρ(n)B;K)
+PDV1H2 (ρ
(m)
A;K⊗ρ(n)B;K)+PDH2V2 (ρ
(m)
A;K⊗ρ(n)B;K). (3.11)
The error terms in Z basis, QZE , corresponds to when Alice and Bob send the same bit, and it
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is given by
QZE =
1
2 ∑m=0,1
QZAB(ρ
(m)
A;K⊗ρ(m)B;K), (3.12)
where QZAB defined by Equation (3.11) and represents the probability of a successful BSM if Alice
and Bob send a state given in the argument. The QBER in the Z basis is then given by
e11;Z =
QZE
QZAB
. (3.13)
The error probability in the X basis can be calculated by considering two cases. If the two send
identical its, we have errors if we get two clicks on two orthogonally polarised detectors from two
opposite sides, i.e., DH1V2 or DV1H2 (see Figure 3.2):
QXE1 =
1
2 ∑m=0,1
[PDH1V2 (ρ
(m)
A;X ⊗ρ(m)B;X )+PDV1H2 (ρ
(m)
A;X ⊗ρ(m)B;X )] (3.14)
If the bits sent from the users are complimentary then an error is occured in the case that two
detectors click on the same side, i.e., DH1V1 or DH2V2 (see Figure 3.2). Then the error probability
in the X basis becomes
QXE2 =
1
2 ∑m=0,1
[PDH1V1 (ρ
(m)
A;X ⊗ρ(1−m)B;X )+PDH2V2 (ρ
(m)
A;X ⊗ρ(1−m)B;X )] (3.15)
The QBER in the X basis is then given by
e11;X =
QXE
QXAB
, (3.16)
where QXE = Q
X
E1+Q
X
E2.
Finally to find the key rate we have to take into account the probability of a successful click
pattern in the Z basis as given from Equation (3.11) when the input state is given by Equation
(3.1), given that the users have sent a single-photon each. Then the key rate is given by [64]
R≥ QZAB[1−h(e11;X)− f h(e11;Z)]. (3.17)
Having fully analysed the key rate formula and the QBER we move on to the next section to
apply numerical results in specific cases, such as the symmetric setup when the source fidelities
change in a given input density matrix.
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3.5 Numerical results
In this section, we study the impact of different parameters on the secret key generation rate of
our scheme in different cases. We compare in a symmetric setup the QBER in X and Z bases
and additionally the secret key generation rate per transmitted pulse for different fidelities of the
single-photon BB84 states. We continue with the case of an imperfect single-photon source on
one side and an ideal single-photon source on the other side to obtain again the QBER in X and Z
bases and the key rate for both the asymmetric and symmetric setups. In the asymmetric setup
we make the assumption that Alice is at distance LA = L from the measurement module, whereas
Bob is at zero distance from the measurement module, i.e., LB = 0. We have used Matlab to
analytically obtain expressions for Equations (3.12), (3.16) and (3.17). In the symmetric setup
the distance for Alice and Bob is considered equal, i.e., LA = LB = L/2. Finally, we compare the
results of the two setups. Next we compare the symmetric and asymmetric setups again in terms
of the secret key rate and QBER versus distance. All results have been obtained assuming an error
correction inefficiency f = 1.16, 0.2 dB per km of loss in the channel, detection efficiency of
ηd = 0.15, dark count rate per pulse pdc = 3×10−6, and no misalignments, i.e., edA = edB = 0.
We used the density matrix from Equation (3.1) where Alice and Bob use the BB84 encoded
single photon states in either X or Z basis and we analyse how these parameters change under
different assumptions on the fidelity of the input density state. The fidelity is a parameter that
estimates the quality of a state. In this case we are studying the quality of the single-photon states
and their imperfections in two scenarios, when the users both use an imperfect single-photon
source and when one user uses an imperfect single-photon source and the other uses a perfect
single-photon source.
• Case A
In the case that both users use imperfect single-photon sources, then the input density matrix
stands as Equation (3.1). We want to compare the QBER terms in X and Z basis, for
different fidelities of the diagonal terms. Hence we take the non-diagonal terms equal to
zero (β ,β ∗ = 0) from Eq. (3.1). The input state for Alice and
ρ(m)A;K = α
(m)
A;K|H〉〈H|+ γ(m)A;K|V 〉〈V | (3.18)
and similarly for Bob
ρ(n)B;K = α
(n)
B;K|H〉〈H|+ γ(n)B;K)|V 〉〈V | (3.19)
where α+γ = 1 and m,n= {0,1} represents the transmitted bit in basis K= {X ,Z}. Alice’s
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input state for bit zero is given by
ρ(0)
(A;Z) = F |H〉〈H|+(1−F)|V 〉〈V |, (3.20)
and for bit one,
ρ(1)
(A;Z) = F |V 〉〈V |+(1−F)|H〉〈H|, (3.21)
where F is the fidelity of the single-photon state with given input in the Z basis. Bob’s input
states are similar to Equations (3.20) and (3.21). Neglecting all other sources of error but
the modulation errors, the QBER in Z becomes
--- F=100% 
--- F=99% 
--- F=98% 
--- F=97%
--- F=95%
Figure 3.4: This is a comparison of the QBER-versus-distance in the Z and X basis of
a symmetric setup for different fidelity values.
e11;Z =
2F(1−F)
2F(1−F)+F2+(1−F)2
= 2F(1−F). (3.22)
To derive the QBER in Z basis, we have considered the cases that we have both users send
identical bits but due to the imperfections of single photons described by Equations (3.20)
and (3.21) there is a probability to have a click on two detectors as expected in the correct
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case. For instance, if Alice and Bob send bit zero, then there is a probability QZE = 2F(1−F)
to get a correct pattern of clicks. We use a similar single-photon state with fidelity F to the
intended state for Alice or Bob in the X basis. For instance for bit zero, we have
ρ(0)
(A;X) = F |+〉〈+|+(1−F)|−〉〈−|
=
1
2
(|H〉〈H|+ |V 〉〈V |)+
(2F−1)
2
(|H〉〈V |+ |V 〉〈H|) (3.23)
Under these assumptions, the QBER in X is equal to the Z basis. Figure 3.4 shows the
QBER versus distance for different values of fidelity in the scenario of a symmetric setup.
It can be seen that as the fidelity is lower the QBER is increased due to the inefficiencies
from the source’s part. If the fidelity remains higher than F = 95% then the protocol is still
secure and practically employable. For values roughly lower than F = 95% the protocol is
insecure. At low distances, the major source of error is the modulation error so the QBER
follows the relation in Equation (3.21). The QBER becomes very high for distances of
roughly 300 km because the dark count effects becomes the major source of errors in long
distances. The QBER in X basis is similar to the QBER in Z.
• Case B
In the case that Alice uses an imperfect single-photon source and Bob uses instead an ideal
single-photon source, then the input density matrix for Bob according to Equation (3.1)
will become the same as Equation (3.19) with the difference that either α or γ becomes
0 and the other one becomes 1. For Alice the input state is given by Equations (3.20) and
(3.21). The QBER in Z, in the low distance regime is then given by
e11;Z =
2(1−F)
2F+2(1−F) = 1−F. (3.24)
The QBER in X is equal to the one from Z basis for the above input setting. The results
for the QBER in Z are given in Figure 3.5. From Figure 3.5, we can see that as the fidelity
decreases the state-preparation flaws contribute to higher values of QBER when compared
to the corresponding values of QBER in Z basis for the same distance. This is similar to the
QBER in Figure 3.4 with the difference that in the former, the values of QBER is almost
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half the value than the latter. This is due to the fact that the QBER in the case where both
users have imperfect single-photon sources there is a higher chance for a modulation error
at the sources’ side, whereas if only one user uses an imperfect source and the other has a
perfect single-photon source, the chance is lower.
--- F=100% 
--- F=97%
--- F=95%
--- F=92% 
Figure 3.5: Comparison of the QBER in Z basis for a symmetric setup for different
fidelity values using an imperfect single-photon source and an ideal single-photon
source.
• Case C
Here, we study the effect of the non-diagonal terms, in the input density matrix Equation
(3.1) (β ,β ∗> 0). We have made the assumption, for simplicity, that only the X basis accepts
non-ideal single photons, whereas the Z basis accepts only perfect single photon states. The
motivation behind this assumption is to study how it would affect the performance of the
key generation rate if one of the single-photon encoders tolerates modulation errors and the
other one is considered an ideal single-photon encoder. We use this assumption in Chapter
5.
The input density matrix for each user is given similarly to Equation (3.23) with the
difference that the fidelity includes also the non-diagonal terms. Figure 3.6 shows how the
QBER in X basis changes versus distance for different values of the non-diagonal terms in
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a symmetric setup. In this scenario we kept the values for Z the same and equal to the ideal
single photon scenario. As we can see from this figure the lower the fidelity, the higher the
QBER is at the sources’ side. Similarly for longer distances than roughly 300 km the dark
count effect becomes dominant over the correct clicks leading to non secure keys being
generated. The fidelity is proportionally related to the non-diagonal terms therefore for
higher values of fidelity the higher the values of the non-diagonal terms will be. Given the
QBER in Z basis is very small, the QBER in X can be more than 11%.
--- F=100% 
--- F=97% 
--- F=95% 
--- F=92% 
--- F=90% 
Figure 3.6: This is a comparison of the QBER-versus-distance in the X basis of a
symmetric setup for different fidelity values of the non-diagonal terms.
In the next section we will compare in the above three cases how the key rate versus distance
performance is affected in each scenario.
3.5.1 Rate-versus-distance
In this sections, we discuss the effects of fidelity and symmetry of the setup on the secret key
generation rate. We make a comparison for the symmetric (LA = LB = L/2) and asymmetric
(LA = L and LB = 0) setup cases respectively to the cases taken in the previous section.
• Case A
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In this scenario both Alice and Bob use imperfect single photon states (Equation (3.18) and
(3.19) where the non-diagonal terms are taken as zero). In Figure 3.7, we can see that, for a
symmetric setup, as the fidelity of the single photon states decreases the secure distance
becomes lower. Secure distance is defined as the distance where the QBER is lower than
11%. The fidelity of a single photon source affects directly the QBER in both bases and
therefore the key rate in terms of distance. For values of fidelity equal and lower than 95%
there is a significant drop on the distance, reaching roughly 150 km. If the fidelities are kept
higher than 97%, the distance ranges from around 280 km to the highest given by 320 km
(for F=100%). The cut-off distance in each case is due to the path loss and dark count being
dominant over the correct clicks, therefore there is a lower chance to retrieve a secret key.
--- F=100%
--- F=98%
--- F=97% 
--- F=95%
Figure 3.7: Comparison of the Rate-versus-distance for a symmetric setup for different
fidelity values.
• Case B
In this case Alice and Bob follow the input states given from Case B in the previous section
where Alice sends perfect single photon states whereas Bob sends imperfect single photon
states. The Figure 3.8 is for the symmetric setup for different values of fidelity. As in the
previous case in Figure 3.7 as the fidelity of the single photon states decreases, the secure
distance decreases accordingly. A difference between these two Figures is that the errors
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contributed in the former case are from both sources being imperfect whereas in the latter
case there is only one imperfect source. This means that for the same fidelities (e.g. 95%)
the distance reaches longer lengths in the latter case (over 250 km) whereas in the former
case it reaches up to roughly 160 km.
--- F=100%
--- F=97% 
--- F=95%
--- F=91%
Figure 3.8: Comparison of the key rate versus distance for a symmetric setup for
different fidelity values using an imperfect single-photon source and an ideal single-
photon source.
In the same scenario where the input states are given as above, we have also made a
comparison between an asymmetric and a symmetric setup. Figure 3.9 shows the difference
between a symmetric and an asymmetric setup for the same fidelity values. The difference
between the symmetric and asymmetric for fidelities 97% and 98% is that the asymmetric
has lower key rate for the same distances and also reaches shorter distances (150 km and
170 km respectively) compared to the symmetric counterparts (close to 300 km and 350km
respectively).
The difference between the asymmetric and symmetric case is the proximity of the BSM
module to the source. The overall scaling of the path loss remains the same for both setups.
However in the asymmetric, one of the sources is next to the BSM module, thus the error is
given only by one side. This has a negative effect on the asymmetric case giving a higher
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QBER and at the same time, lower key rate for the same distances and fidelities as we can
see from Figure 3.9.
Symmetric:
-- F =98%
--- F=97% 
Asymmetric:
--- F=98% 
--- F=97%
Figure 3.9: Comparison of the key rate versus distance for a symmetric and an
asymmetric setup for different fidelity values using an imperfect single-photon source
and an ideal single-photon source.
• Case C
In this case the input states are given as in Section 3.5 where for both Alice and Bob in the
Z basis use ideal BB84 encoded single photons, whereas in the X basis their single photons
have imperfections during the state-preparation stage. From Figure 3.10 As the fidelity in
the X basis decreases, the key rate decreases. The higher the fidelity, the higher the key rate
and the longer the secure distance is. For example at F = 97% the distance reaches up to
300 km whereas for fidelities of 85% the cut-off distance is limited to 240 km. Because in
this case, we have mainly X errors we can tolerate rather low fidelities.
3.6 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we studied and analysed the scenario of imperfect single-photon sources in an
MDI-QKD protocol in terms of secret key generation rate and QBER with two different types of
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--- F=100% 
--- F=97% 
--- F=93% 
--- F=89%
--- F=85%
Figure 3.10: Key rate versus distance for different fidelities of the non-diagonal terms
in a symmetric setup.
sources and symmetries of the setup.We considered different sources of imperfections such as
channel loss, quantum efficiency and dark counts and obtained the optimal regime of operation as a
function of system parameters. We first modeled the density matrix for an imperfect single-photon
source in order to obtain the secret key rate and the QBER in X and Z bases.
Firstly we compared an imperfect single photon source, which emits a mixture of single
photons of different polarisations at the state-preparation stage with different probabilities. We
made a comparison for the diagonal terms and found that the higher fidelity they have the lower
the QBER is and the higher key rate and longer distances can be achieved. If the fidelity is kept
well above 95% we can still retrieve secret key in distances longer than 150 km.
Additionally we compared how the key rate performance changes in the case when one of the
users has an ideal single-photon source and the other user has an imperfect single-photon source
with the case that both users have imperfect sources. For the same fidelities, we have found that
the key rate is higher for longer distances in the former when compared to the latter case.
Finally for an ideal source and an imperfect source, we compared two different symmetry
setups for the same input density matrix as above. In the symmetric setup we assume that both
users are at an equal distance from the measurement module. In the an asymmetric setup the
distance for one user is taken as zero and the other user is at a double the distance from the first
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case. As their total loss remains equal for both cases, we compare how the symmetry changes
when the BSM module is either next to one of the sources or located in the middle of both sources.
We have concluded that in the asymmetric case, the QBER is higher as the loss is modeled on one
side instead of both as in the symmetric case. This works as a negative effect for the asymmetric
setup as the key rate is lower when compared to its counterpart in the symmetric setup for the
same distances.
In this chapter we showed that an MDI-QKD protocol is still employable when considering
that the source has imperfections at the state-preparation stage. To achieve a more efficient and
still feasible implementation we introduce QMs in an MDI-QKD scenario in Chapters 4 and 5
which under certain assumptions we can improve the performance of the MDI-QKD protocol.
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Chapter 4
Memory-assisted MDI-QKD
4.1 Introduction
Despite all commercial and experimental achievements in QKD [38, 39, 40, 41, 42], reaching
arbitrarily long distances is still a remote objective. The fundamental solution to this problem, i.e.,
quantum repeaters, is known for over a decade. From early proposals by Briegel et al. [43] to
the latest no-memory version by Munro et al. [44], quantum repeaters, typically, rely on highly
efficient quantum gates comparable to what we may need for future quantum computers. While
the progress on that ground may take some time before such systems become functional, another
approach based on probabilistic gate operations was proposed by Duan and coworkers [45],
which could offer a simpler way of implementing quantum repeaters for moderate distances of
up to around 1000 km. The latter systems require quantum memory modules with high coupling
efficiencies to light and with coherence times exceeding the transmission delays, which are yet to
be achieved together. In this chapter, we propose a protocol that, although is not as scalable as
quantum repeaters, for certain classes of memories, relaxes, to some extent, the harsh requirements
on memories’ coherence times, thereby paving the way for the existing technologies to beat the
highest distance records achieved for no-memory QKD links [38]. The idea behind our protocol
was presented in [46], and, recently, and, independently, has also been used in [47]. This work
proposes additional practical schemes and rigorously analyzes them under realistic conditions.
Our protocol relies on concepts from quantum repeaters, on the one hand, and the recently
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proposed measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), on the other. The original MDI-
QKD [4] relies on sending encoded photons by the users to a middle site at which a Bell-state
measurement (BSM) is performed. This BSM can be done by an untrusted party, e.g., the service
provider, which makes MDI-QKD resilient to detector attacks, e.g., time-shift, remapping, and
blinding attacks [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. The security is then guaranteed by the reverse EPR
protocol [33]. In our scheme, by using two quantum memories at the middle site, we first store the
state of the transmitted photons in the memories, and perform the required BSM, only when both
memories are loaded. This way, similar to quantum repeaters, we achieve a rate-versus-distance
improvement as compared to the MDI-QKD schemes proposed in [4, 48], or other conventional
QKD systems that do not use quantum memories.
There is an important distinction between our protocol and a conventional quantum repeater
system. In a typical quantum repeater link, which relies on initial entanglement distribution
among neighboring nodes, the repeat period for the protocol is mainly dictated by the transmission
delay for the shortest segment of the repeater system [49, 50]. In our scheme, however, the repeat
period is constrained by the writing time, including the time needed for the herald/verification
process, into memories. This implies that using sufficiently fast memories, one can run our
scheme at a faster rate than that of a quantum repeater, thereby achieving higher key generation
rates, as compared to conventional QKD links, and at lower coherence times, as compared to
probabilistic repeater systems. This increase in clock rate is what our proposal shares with the
recently proposed third generation of quantum repeaters, which use quantum error correction
codes to compensate for loss and errors, thus also being able to speed up the clock rate to local
processing times [44]. The need for long coherence times remains one of the key challenges in
implementing the first generations of quantum repeaters before the latest no-memory quantum
repeater proposals can be implemented.
The above two benefits would offer a midterm solution to the problem of long-distance QKD.
While our scheme is not scalable the same way that quantum repeaters are, it possibly allows us to
use the existing technology for quantum memories to improve the performance of QKD systems.
In the absence of fully operational quantum repeater systems, our setup can fill the gap between
theory and practice and will become one of the first applications of realistic quantum memories in
quantum communications.
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4.2 This chapter’s contibution
• We analyze the memory-assisted MDI-QKD in a realistic scenario. We consider two
different sources. Single-photon sources and the decoy states. In the first case, we use BB84
single photon states and in the second, we use phase-randomized coherent states. In each
case we find the secret key generation rate versus distance.
• We analyse the storage time of imperfect QMs and how it affects system performance.
We show that these QMs have lower coherence time requirements compared to the multi-
memory probabilistic quantum repeaters. Additionally we prove that our proposed protocol
can outperform the conventional QKD schemes in terms of rate-versus-distance and has the
advantage of being practically constructed with the means of existing technology for QMs.
• We also consider the case of imperfect ensemble based QMs in the memory-assisted MDI-
QKD. The ensemble based QMs suffer from multiple excitations thus leading to a lower
performance than conventional no-memory systems in practical regimes of interest.
The rest of the Chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.3, we describe our proposed
schemes and the modeling used for each component therein. Section 4.4.1 presents our key rate
analysis, followed by some numerical results in Section 4.5. Section 4.7 concludes the Chapter.
4.3 System description
Our scheme relies on “loading” quantum memories (QMs) with certain, unknown, states of light.
This loading process needs to be heralding, that is, by the end of it, we should learn about its
success. Within our scheme, two types of memories can be employed, which we refer to by
directly versus indirectly heralding QMs. Some QMs can operate in both ways, while some
others are more apt to one than the other. By directly heralding memories we refer to the class
of memories to which we can directly transfer the state of a photon and we can verify—without
revealing or demolishing the quantum state—whether this writing process has been successful.
An example of such memories is a trapped atom in an optical cavity [65]. In the case of indirectly
heralding memories, a direct writing-verification scheme may not exist. Instead, we assume that
we can entangle a photonic state with the state of such QMs [45, 66, 67], and later, by doing a
measurement on the photon, we can effectively achieve a heralded writing into the memory. These
two approaches of writing cover most relevant practical examples to our scheme.
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The scheme for directly heralding memories works as follows [46, 47]; see Figure 2.5(a). The
two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, send BB84 encoded pulses [1], by either single-photon
or weak laser sources, towards QM units located in the middle of the link. Each QM stores a
photon in a possibly probabilistic, but heralding, way. Once both memories are loaded, we retrieve
their states and perform a BSM on the corresponding photons. A successful BSM indicates some
form of correlation between the transmitted bits by Alice and Bob.
We can easily extend the above idea to the case of indirectly heralding memories. An additional
BSM, on each side, along with an entangling process between photons and QMs, can replace
the verification process needed for directly heralding memories. In this case, see Figure 2.5(b), a
successful BSM between the transmitted photon by the users and the one entangled with the QM,
would effectively herald a successful loading process, that is, the state of the QM is correlated
with the quantum state sent by the users.
Here, for simplicity, we work with polarization entanglement. Suppose once we entangle the
memory A with a single photon P, the joint state of the two is given by
1√
2
[|sH〉A|H〉P+ |sV 〉A|V 〉P], (4.1)
where |H〉P and |V 〉P, respectively, represent horizontally and vertically polarized single photons,
and |sH〉A and |sV 〉A are the corresponding memory states. By tracing out the memory system A in
Equation (4.1), one can see that the photonic state out of the memory is similar to that of a BB84
encoder. Each leg of Figure 2.5(b), from the source to the respective QM, is then similar to an
asymmetric setup of the original MDI-QKD scheme as depicted in Figure 2.5(c). The working
of the system in Figure 2.5(b) will then follow that of the original MDI-QKD. We will use this
similarity in our analysis of the system in Figure 2.5(b).
The main advantage of our scheme as compared to the original MDI-QKD, in Figure 2.5(c), is
its higher resilience to channel loss and dark count. In the no-memory MDI-QKD, both pulses,
sent by Alice and Bob, should survive the path loss before a BSM can be performed. The key
generation rate then scales with the loss in the entire channel. In our scheme, each pulse still
needs to survive the path loss over half of the link, but this can happen in different rounds for
the signal sent by Alice as compared to that of Bob. We therefore achieve the quantum repeater
benefit in that the key generation rate, in the symmetric case, scales with the loss over half of
the total distance. Moreover, in the case of directly heralding memories, our scheme is almost
immune against dark counts [47]. This is because the measurement efficiency in the BSM module
is typically a few orders of magnitude higher than that of dark count rates. Dark counts will then
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only sightly add to the error rate. In our scheme, memory decoherence errors play a major role as
we will explain in this and the following sections.
In the following, we describe the protocol and its components in more detail.
4.3.1 Protocol
In our protocol, Alice and Bob, at a rate RS, send BB84 encoded pulses to the middle station
(dashed box in Figure 2.5). At the QMs, for each incoming pulse, we either apply a loading
process by which we can store the state of the photons into memories and verify it, or use the
indirectly heralding scheme of Figure 2.5(b). Once successful for a particular QM, we stop the
loading procedure on that QM, and wait until both memories are loaded, at which point, a BSM is
performed on the QMs. The BSM results are sent back to Alice and Bob, and the above procedure
is being repeated until a sufficient number of raw key bits is obtained. The rest of the protocol is
the same as that of MDI-QKD. Sifting and postprocessing will be performed on the raw key to
obtain a secret key. In this chapter, we neglect the finite-size-key effects in our analysis [62].
4.3.2 Component modeling
In this section, we model each component of Figure 2.5 including sources and encoders, the
channel, QMs, and the BSM module.
4.3.2.1 Sources and encoders
We consider two types of sources: ideal single-photon sources and phase-randomized weak laser
pulses. The latter will be used in the decoy-state [56] version of the protocol. Each source, at both
Alice’s and Bob’s sides, generates pulses at a rate RS. Each pulse is polarization encoded in either
the rectilinear (Z) or diagonal (X) basis. Here, we use the efficient version of BB84 encoding,
where the Z basis is used much more frequenctly than the other basis [57]. The pulse duration is
denoted by τp and it is chosen in accordance with the requirements of the memory system in use.
4.3.2.2 Channels
The distance between Alice (Bob) and the respective QM is denoted by LA (LB). The total distance
between Alice and Bob is denoted by L = LA+LB. The transmission coefficient for a channel
with length l is given by
ηch(l)≡ exp(−l/Latt), (4.2)
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where Latt is the attenuation length of the channel (roughly, 22 km for 0.2 dB/km of loss).
The channel is considered to have a background rate of γBG per polarization mode, which
results in an average pBG = 2γBGτp background photons per pulse. This can stem from stray light
or crosstalk from other channels, especially if classical signals are multiplexed with quantum ones
in a network setup [42, 41, 68, 69, 70].
We also consider setup misalignment in our analysis. We assume certain polarization mainte-
nance schemes are in place for the Alice’s and Bob’s channels, so that the reference frames at the
sources and memories are, on average, the same. We, nevertheless, consider a setup misalignment
error probability edK , for K = A,B, to represent misalignment errors in each channel.
4.3.2.3 Quantum memories
H|V|
VS| g| HS|
Figure 4.1: One possible energy-level configuration for a QM suitable for polarization
encoding.
We use the following assumptions and terminologies for the employed QMs. This list covers
most relevant parameters in an experimental setup, whether the QM is operated in the directly or
indirectly heralding mode.
• In the case of a successful loading, each QM in Figure 4.1 ideally stores a polarization qubit
corresponding to the polarization of the incoming pulse. We assume that this is the case
even if at the input of the QM there is a non-qubit state, e.g., a coherent state. One suitable
energy level structure for such a memory is the double-Λ configuration, with a common
ground state and two other metastable states corresponding to two orthogonal polarizations.
The excited states can then facilitate Raman transitions from the ground state to each of
the metastable states, using known optical transition techniques [71, 72], in response to the
input polarization state.
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We assume that each QM only stores one spatio-temporal mode of light. Our protocol can
be extended to incorporate multimode QMs [73] or multiple QMs [49], in which case a
linear improvement in the rate is expected. In this work, we focus on the case of a single
logical memory per user and leave extensions to future work.
• For directly heralding memories, we denote the QM’s writing efficiency by ηw. The writing
efficiency is the probability to store a qubit and herald success conditioned on having
a single-photon at the QM’s input. Note that ηw also includes the chance of failure for
our verification process. For indirectly heralding memories, we introduce an entangling
efficiency, ηent, which is the probability of success for entangling a photon with our QM.
• We denote the QM’s reading efficiency by ηr. That is the probability to retrieve a single
photon out of the QM conditioned on a successful loading in the past. The reading efficiency
is expected to decay over a time period t as ηr(t) = ηr0 exp [−t/T1], where T1 is the memory
amplitude decay time and ηr0 is the reading efficiency right after loading. In our example
of a double-Λ-level memory, such a decay corresponds to the transition form one of the
metastable states to the ground state, in which case, no photon will be retrieved from the
memory.
• We denote the QM’s writing time by τw. For directly heralding memories, it is the time
difference between the time that a pulse arrives (beginning of the pulse) at the QM and the
time that a successful/unsuccessful loading is declared. This is practically the fastest repeat
period one can run our protocol. In the case of indirectly heralding memories, τw includes
the time for the entangling process as well as that of the side BSM operation. Accounting
for such timing parameters is essential in enabling us to have a fair comparison between
memory-assisted and no-memory QKD systems.
• We denote the QM’s reading time by τr. It is the time difference between the time that the
retrieval process is applied until a pulse (end of the pulse) is out.
• We denote the QM’s coherence (dephazing) time by T2. For an initial state ρ(0) of the QM
at time zero, its state at a later time t is given by [49]
ρ(t) = p(t)ρ(0)+ [1− p(t)]Zρ(0)Z, (4.3)
where p(t) = [1+ exp(−t/T2)]/2. Note that dephazing would only occur if we are in a
superposition of Z eigenstates, e.g., the eigenstates of X . The above model better captures
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the decoherence effect in most practical cases of interest than the model used in [47], in
which the memory state switches suddenly from an intact one to a fully randomized version
after a certain time. We discuss the implications of each model in our numerical result
section.
4.3.2.4 BSM module
Figure 3.3 shows the schematic of the BSM module used in our analysis. This module enables an
incomplete BSM over photonic states. In order to use this module, in our scheme, we first need to
read out the QMs and convert their qubit states into polarization-encoded photons. The BSM will
then be successful if exactly two detectors click, one H-labeled and one V -labeled. Depending on
which detectors have clicked and what basis is in use, Alice and Bob can identify what bits they
ideally share [48].
We assume the BSM module is symmetric. We lump detector quantum efficiencies with other
possible sources of loss in the BSM module and denote it by ηd for each detector. We also assume
that each detector has a dark count rate of γdc, which results in a probability pdc = γdcτp of having
a dark count per pulse. The implicit assumption here is that the retrieved and the writing photons
have the same pulse width. Finally, we assume that there is no additional misalignment error in
the BSM module.
4.4 Key rate Analysis
In this section, we find the secret key generation rate for our proposed schemes in Figures
2.5(a) and 2.5(b). We later compare it with two conventional QKD schemes, namely, BB84,
summarized in Appendix A, and the original MDI-QKD in Figure 2.5(c), summarized in Ap-
pendix B, that use no memories. In all cases, we consider both single-photon and decoy-state
sources. In all forthcoming sections, f denotes the inefficiency of the error correction scheme,
i.e., the ratio between the actual cost of error correction and its minimum value obtained by
the Shannon’s theorem, assumed to be constant, and we denote the binary entropy function as
h(p) =−p log2(p)− (1− p) log2(1− p), for 0≤ p≤ 1.
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4.4.1 Key rate for single-photon sources
With ideal single-photon sources, the secret key generation rate in the setups of Figures 2.5(a) and
2.5(b) is lower bounded by [52]
RQM = RSY
QM
11 [1−h(eQM11;X)− f h(eQM11;Z)], (4.4)
where efficient BB84 encoding is employed [57]. In the above equation, eQM11;X and e
QM
11;Z , respec-
tively, represent the quantum bit error rate (QBER) between Alice and Bob in the X and Z basis,
when single photons are used, and YQM11 represents the rate at which both memories are loaded
with single photons of the same basis and the middle BSM is successful.
To obtain the individual terms in Equation (4.4), we can decompose the protocol into two parts:
the memory loading step and the measurement step, once both memories are loaded. The first
step is a probabilistic problem with two geometric random variables, NA and NB, corresponding,
respectively, to the number of attempts until we load Alice and Bob’s memories with single
photons. The number of rounds that it takes to load both memories is then max{NA,NB}. Once
both memories are loaded, the rest of the protocol is similar to that of original MDI-QKD in
terms of rate analysis: the QMs replace the sources in Figure 2.5(c) and the total transmission-
detection efficiency is replaced by the reading-measurement efficiency in the BSM module. We
can therefore use many of the relationships obtained for the original MDI-QKD, summarized in
Section 2.6.1, for the memory-assisted versions of Figure 2.5.
For finite values of T1, the reading efficiency for Alice’s QM could be different from that of
Bob. In fact, we can assume that, once both memories are loaded, one of the memories (late) will
be read immediately, while the other (early) |NA−NB| rounds after its successful loading. The
effective measurement efficiency for the leg K, K = A,B, corresponding to the path originating
from memory K in the BSM module will then be given by
ηmK =
{
ηm ≡ ηr0ηd, if memory K is late
ηd ηr(t = |NA−NB|T ), if memory K is early
. (4.5)
With the above setting, and considering the required time for reading from the QMs, we obtain
YQM11 =
1
NL(η1A,η1B)+Nr
E{Y11(ηmA,ηmB)}
=
1
NL(η1A,η1B)+Nr
Y11(ηm,η ′m), (4.6)
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where Y11 is the corresponding yield term, given by Equation (2.22), for the MDI-QKD protocol
and NL=E{max(NA,NB)} is given by Equation (A.3). Here, E{·} represents the expectation value
operator with respect to NA and NB, and η ′m = ηdηr, where ηr = ηr0E{exp(−|NA−NB|T/T1)}
can be obtained from Equation (A.4). In Equation (4.6), Nr, represents the extra rounds lost due
to the nonzero reading times of QMs, once they are both loaded, and is given by
Nr =
⌈
τr+ τw
T
⌉
−1, τr,τw > 0, τw ≤ T, (4.7)
where T = 1/RS is the repetition period. The condition τw ≤ T is a matter of practicality as
sending photons faster than they can be stored is of no benefit. The fastest possible rate is then
obtained at T = τw.
In the case of directly heralding memories of Figure (2.5a), we have
η1K = 1− (1−ηwηch(LK))e−ηwpBG, K = A,B, (4.8)
as the probabilities of successful loading of Alice and Bob’s QMs with single-photon sources (or
background noise). In the case of indirectly heralding memories of Figure (2.5b), following our
discussion in Section (4.3) about the equivalence of each leg of Figure (2.5b) to an asymmetric
MDI-QKD system, we have
η1K = Y11(ηdηch(LK),ηdηent), K = A,B, (4.9)
where the above terms must be calculated at an effective dark count rate of γdc+ γBGηd/2.
We remark that, although obtained from different methods, the analysis in [47] also finds
similar expressions for the yield term. In [47], the analysis is only concerned with the symmetric
setup, and some of the parameters considered in our work take their ideal values. It can be
verified, however, that in the special case of τw = T , τr = 0, γBG = 0, LA = LB, ηw = 1, and
T1 → ∞, for directly heralding memories, Equation (4.6) reduces to the same result obtained
in [47]. By accounting for additional relevant parameters, our analysis offers a better match to
realistic experimental scenarios.
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Similarly, the error terms are given by
eQM11;Z = E{e11;Z(ηmA,ηmB,eQMdZ (η1A,η1B))}
= e11;Z(ηm,η ′m,e
QM
dZ (η1A,η1B)),
eQM11;X = E{e11;X(ηmA,ηmB,eQMdX (η1A,η1B))}
≈ e11;X(ηm,η ′m,E{eQMdX (η1A,η1B)}), (4.10)
where, e11;Z and e11;X , given by Equation (2.22), are the corresponding error terms for the
original MDI-QKD. In addition to the typical sources of error, such as loss and dark count, the
above expressions are functions of misalignment parameters. This misalignment could be a
statistical error in the polarization stability of our setup, modeled by edA and edB, or an effective
misalignment because of memory dephazing [74] and/or background photons. Putting all these
effects together, as we have done in B, we obtain
eQMdS (ηA,ηB) = e
(A)
dS (ηA,ηB)(1− e(B)dS (ηA,ηB))
+ e(B)dS (ηA,ηB)(1− e(A)dS (ηA,ηB)), S= X ,Z, (4.11)
where e(A)dS and e
(B)
dS , respectively, represent the misalignment probabilities for Alice’s and Bob’s
memories, for basis S = {X ,Z}, at loading probabilities ηA and ηB and are given by Equa-
tions (B.2) and (B.5). The above Equation accounts for the fact that if the state of both memories
are flipped, Alice and Bob will still share identical key bits. We assume that the BSM module is
balanced and does not have any setup misalignment.
Note that in Equation (4.11), because of no dephazing errors for the Z eigenstates, eQMdZ is inde-
pendent of NA and NB, whereas e
QM
dX is a function of them. The approximation in Equation (4.10)
assumes E{eQMdX ηmAηmB} ≈ E{eQMdX }E{ηmAηmB}, which is valid when T1 T2, to give a more
readable final result.
Equation (4.11) can also be used in the case of indirectly heralding QMs as explained in
Appendix B. The main idea is to use the analogy of each leg in Figure 2.5(b) with the original
MDI-QKD in Figure 2.5(c).
4.4.2 Key rate for decoy states
Suppose Alice and Bob use a decoy-state scheme with average photon numbers µ and ν , respec-
tively, for the two main signal intensities, and infinitely many auxiliary decoy states. The secret
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key generation rate, in the limit of infinitely long key, is then given by
RQM = RS[Q
QM
11 (1−h(eQM11;X))− fQQMµν ;Zh(EQMµν ;Z)], (4.12)
where
QQMµν ;Z =
1
NL(ηµA,ηνB)+Nr
Y11(ηm,η ′m) (4.13)
is the rate at which both memories are loaded, by Alice (Bob) sending a coherent state in the Z
basis with µ (ν) average number of photons, and a successful BSM is achieved. In the case of
directly heralding memories,
ηµA = 1− e−ηch(LA)ηwµ−ηwpBG and ηµB = 1− e−ηch(LB)ηwν−ηwpBG (4.14)
are the probabilities for successful loading of Alice and Bob’s QMs with coherent-state sources.
Similarly,
EQMµν ;Z = e11;Z(ηm,η
′
m,e
QM
dZ (ηµA,ηνB)) (4.15)
is the QBER in the Z basis, and
QQM11 = Q
QM
µν ;Z
η1Aη1B
ηµAηνB
µνe−µ−ν (4.16)
is the contribution of single-photon states in the gain term of Equation (4.13).
Similar to the treatment in the previous subsection, one can find or approximate the above
terms in the case of indirectly heralding memories as well as analysed in the next Chapter.
Apart from all additional parameters considered in our model as compared to [47], our
treatment of the decoy-state QKD is different from that of [47] in the way that QMs are modeled.
In our work, we assume QMs store qubits, which while is not necessarily an exact model, it often
serves a good first-order approximation to the reality. In [47], however, QMs are assumed to be
able to store number states. This assumption seems more restrictive as many QMs, such as single
trapped atoms or ions, can only store one photon.
4.4.3 Storage time
To get some insight into the working of our system, in this section, we simulate the achievable
rates assuming LA = LB = L/2. The average number of trials to load both memories from
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Equation (A.3) is then given by [75]
NL(η ,η) =
3−2η
η(2−η) ≈
3
2
· 1
η
, for η  1, (4.17)
where η is the probability of successfully loading a QM at distance L/2, approximately, given by
ηQM exp(−(L/2)/Latt), where ηQM = ηw for directly heralding memories, and ηQM = ηentη2d for
indirectly heralding QMs. Similarly, the average required storage time, from Equation (A.5), is
given by
Tst = E{|NA−NB|}T = 2(1−η)Tη(2−η) ≈
T
η
, for η  1, (4.18)
which is similar to the result reported in [47].
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Figure 4.2: Average required storage time, Tst , versus distance, in our scheme, for
different repetition rates 1/τw. As compared to that of a probabilistic quantum
repeater, labeled by L/c, where c= 2×108 m/s is the speed of light in optical fiber,
our scheme requires lower coherence times up to a certain distance. The crossover
distance at τw = 1 µs is over 300 km and at τw = 1 ns is nearly 700 km. In all curves,
ηw = ηd = ηent = 1 and pBG = 0.
The secret key generation rate in Equations (4.4) and (4.12) is proportional to the pulse
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generation rate RS = 1/T at the encoder. To maximize RS, we choose T = τw, throughout this
section and next, resulting in Tst ≈ τw/η . Figure (4.2) compares Tst with the required storage
time in multi-memory probabilistic quantum repeaters [49], L/c, where c is the speed of light in
the channel. It can be seen that our scheme offers lower required coherence times until a certain
distance. With fast memories of shorter than 10 ns of access time, this crossover distance could be
longer than 500 km. With such memories, the required coherence time at 300 km is roughly 1 µs,
or lower, as compared to over 1 ms for probabilistic quantum repeaters.
It is worth mentioning that the possible advantage of requiring low coherence times is only
achievable for systems with nesting level one, i.e., with one stage of entanglement swapping. Un-
like quantum repeaters, our protocol, in terms of its timing, is not scalable to higher nesting levels.
Nevertheless, even with only one entanglement swapping stage, our protocol can outperform
conventional QKD schemes in terms of rate-versus-distance behaviour, and, more importantly,
this can possibly be achieved with existing technology for quantum memories. We explore this
and other aspects of our scheme in the next section.
4.5 Numerical results
In this section, we study the impact of various parameters on the secret key generation rate of our
scheme. All results have been obtained assuming the symmetric setup described in Section (4.4.3),
τw = T , f = 1.16, c= 2×108 m/s, and 0.2 dB/km of loss in the channel. We also compare our
scheme with the efficient BB84 and MDI-QKD protocols, whose secret key generation rates are,
respectively, summarized in Appendices A and B.
4.5.1 Coherence time
In this section, we discuss the effects of memory dephazing on the secret key generation rate. As
mentioned before, while our scheme in Figure 2.5(a) is particularly resilient to dark count errors, it
still suffers from memory errors. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the secret key generation rate per pulse
at different coherence times for the scheme of Figure 2.5(a). A finite coherence time is the only
source of nonideality considered in this Figure. Since, in our model, the dephazing process only
affects the diagonal basis, eQM11;Z = 0 at all distances; hence RQM ∝ 1−h(eQM11;X) remains always
positive. The rate is initially proportional to exp(−(L/2)/Latt), and with low values of eQM11;X for
short distances, our scheme beats the BB84 case depicted by the dashed line. Note that, because
of the partial BSM in Figure 3.3, the initial key rate at L = 0 for our scheme is lower than that
of BB84. At large distances, however, the dephazing process becomes significant and results in
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Figure 4.3: Secret key generation rate per pulse for the heralded scheme of Figure
2.5(a) for different values of T2/T using single-photon sources. The dashed line
represents the ideal efficient BB84 case. Unless explicitly mentioned, all other
parameters assume their ideal values: T1→ ∞, ηw = ηr0 = ηd = 1, γBG = γdc = 0,
edA = edB = 0, and τr = 0.
eQM11;X approaching 1/2; see the inset. Subsequently, RQM decays with a faster slope and at some
point becomes lower than what one can achieve with an ideal BB84 system. The window between
the two crossing points on each curve is the range where our scheme, can, in principle, beat a
noise-free BB84 system. This window is larger for QMs with longer coherence times.
In [47], authors look at the minimum required coherence time to achieve nonzero key rates,
assuming eQM11;X = e
QM
11;Z within their model of decoherence. Although the models used for decoher-
ence in our work and [47] are different, eQM11;X has a similar behaviour in both cases. In our case,
however, the transition from 0 to 1/2 is smoother than that of [47]. This is expected as the model
in [47] is an abrupt good-bad model for the memory. A consequence of this difference is that the
minimum required coherence time is then higher in our case, which highlights the importance of
the more accurate model we have used for decoherence.
The comparison in Figure 4.3 assumes that the source rate RS is the same for both the BB84
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Figure 4.4: Secret key generation rate for different values of τw at T2/T = 1000 using
single-photon sources. The dashed line represents the ideal efficient BB84 case at
RS = 1 Gpulse/s. Unless explicitly mentioned, all other parameters assume their ideal
values: T1→ ∞, ηw = ηr0 = ηd = 1, γBG = γdc = 0, edA = edB = 0, and τr = 0.
protocol and our scheme. In our scheme, however, RS depends on the writing time of the memories.
Figure 4.4 shows the secret key generation rate for the scheme of Figure 2.5(a) at a fixed value of
T2/T = 1000, but for several values of T = τw = 1/RS. The BB84 system is run at a fixed rate of
1 GHz. Again, we assume that the only source of nonideality is memory dephazing. It can be
seen that slow memories with writing times of 100 ns, or higher, can hardly compete with an ideal
BB84 system. The two orders of magnitude lost because of the lower repetition rate cannot be
compensated within the first 300 km. It is still possible to beat the BB84 case, at long distances, if
memories have higher coherence times.
4.5.2 Realistic examples
It is interesting to see if any of the existing technologies for quantum devices can be employed in
our scheme to beat conventional QKD systems. Figure 4.5 makes such a comparison between
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BB84, MDI-QKD, and memory-assisted MDI-QKD for a particular experimental setup. We have
chosen our QM based on the two lessons learned from Figures 4.2 and 4.4: the QM needs to
have a high bandwidth-storage product (T2/τw) on the order of 1000 or higher, and, it also needs
to be fast, with writing times on the order of nanoseconds. Both these criteria are met for the
QM used in [5], which particularly offers fast reading and writing with 300-ps-long pulses at a
storage time of around 4 µs. The employed memory in this experiment is an atomic ensemble,
which fits our indirectly heralding scheme of Figure 2.5(b). We assume that, by driving this
ensemble with short pulses, one can ideally generate the jointly entangled state in Equation (4.1)
between the ensemble and a photon [76], where, in this case, |sH〉 and |sV 〉 are, respectively, the
corresponding symmetric collective excited states to horizontal and vertical polarizations [45, 77].
By keeping the entangling efficiency low at ηent = 0.05, here, we neglect the effect of multiple
excitations in such memories [66, 78, 74]. We also assume that T2 = T1 and use the state-of-the-art
single-photon detectors with ηd = 0.93 at γdc = 1 count per second and 150 ps of time resolution
[79] for all systems.
We consider two sets of parameter values for our employed QM in Figure 4.5. In the first
set, corresponding to the curve labeled A on the Figure, we use the same numerical values as
reported in [5], that is, ηr0 = 0.3, T1 = 4 µs, and τw = τr = τp = 300 ps. We, however, assume
that RS = 1/τw, which is much faster than the repetition rate used in [5]. In the curve labeled B,
we improve the performance by assuming ηr0 = 0.73, which is what another group has obtained
for a similar type of memory [76], and T1 = T2 = 100 µs, which is attainable by improving
magnetic shielding [80]. It can be seen that, whereas the current QM employed in [5] is short
of beating either of no-memory systems, our slightly boosted system, in curve B, outperforms
both systems at over roughly 200 km. The cut-off distance in curve B is about 400 km, which
is mainly because of memory decoherence, and it can be improved by using memories with
longer coherence times. This implies that with slightly improving some experimental parameters,
we would be able to employ realistic QMs to improve the performance of practical quantum
communication setups. We remark that the example QM chosen in Figure 4.5 is not necessarily
the only option, and improved versions of other types of memories can potentially offer the same
performance [67, 81, 82, 83].
4.6 MDI-QKD with ensemble-based memories
In the memory-assisted MDI-QKD we achieve an improvement on rate-versus-distance over
the no-memory MDI-QKD systems. However in order to beat the no-memory QKD systems,
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Figure 4.5: Secret key generation rate for single-photon BB84 (dotted), MDI-QKD
(dashed), and our indirectly heralding scheme of Figure 2.5(b) (solid) at practical
parameter values. In all curves, ηd = 0.93, γdc = 1/s, γBG = 0, and edA = edB = 0.005.
For BB84 and MDI-QKD, RS = 3.3 G pulse/s, similar to RS = 1/τw, in our scheme.
For our scheme, we have used the experimental parameters reported in [5]. For the
curve labeled A, ηent = 0.05, ηr0 = 0.3, T1 = T2 = 4 µs, and τw = τr = τp = 300 ps.
For the curve labeled B, everything is the same except that ηr0 = 0.73 and T1 = T2 =
100 µs.
according to our setup described in Figure 2.5(b) must be equipped with QMs that have large
storage-bandwidth products as well as short access and entangling times. The state-of-the-art for
single-qubit QMs, for instance single atoms [67], or ions [84], is still not at the required level
to fullfil the current conditions of practical memory-assisted protocols. More specifically, faster
QMs are needed for the practical ranges of interest.
A suitable candidate that meets the requirements of having very large bandwidths, and therefore
very short acces times, for a memory-assisted protocol, are the ensemble-based memories. The
main drawback of these QMs is that they suffer from multiple-excitation effects, that in turn affect
the results of a successful side BSM that may have been resulted from two photons originating
from the QM in Figure 2.5(b). This fact leads to the final measurement results to have no
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Figure 4.6: Level scheme for the creation of collective excitations in atomi ensembles
via spontaneous Raman emission (write process) and for their readout (read process).
correlation with the transmitted signal by the user. The results from this scheme show that such
effects can be counterproductive in a way that we cannot beat the no-memory QKD systems within
practical ranges of interest. Below there is a brief description of the ensemble-based memory
MDI-QKD scheme [6].
Firstly in this setup the ensemble-based memory can be considered as a non-interacting
ensemble of quantum systems. The QMs are assumed to be an ensemble of neutral atoms with the
Λ configuration as shown in Figure 4.6. One of the possible ways to entangle a photon with a QM
is to excite the ensemble by using a short pulse, conditioned that the ensemble was initially in the
ground state (|g〉). This short pulse should have a probability p of driving an off-resonant Raman
transition in the ensemble kept much lower than one. The joint state of the released Raman optical
field and the ensemble is similar to the two-mode squeezed state given by [85]
|Ψ〉AP =
#ofatoms
∑
n=0
√
(1− p)pn|n〉A|n〉P, (4.19)
where |n〉P is the Fock state for n photons and |n〉A is the symmetric collective state that consists
of n atoms in their |s〉 states. Assuming p 1, then we can truncate the above state at n = 2
without losing much accuracy. Additionally assuming that there is a post-selection mechanism
that selects out the state |0〉A|0〉P then the effective state for the photonic system is
ρP(p) = (1− p)|1〉P〈1|+ p|2〉P〈2|, (4.20)
which denotes an imperfect single-photon source with a nonzero probability p of emitting two
photons. According to Figure 2.5(b) this is the expected type of state that one would get for the
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[6].
photons entangled with the QMs. To be specific the states here represented are not maximally
entangled.
This setup is based on the description from Figure 2.5(b) with the difference that the single-
qubit QMs are now replaced by ensemble based QMs. Alice and Bob are using perfect single-
photon sources. The analysis for the key rate is similar to the one given by Equation (4.4) where
the terms YQM11 , e
QM
11;X and e
QM
11;Z change according to the ensemble based QMs parameters. The
difference with the single-qubit QMs is that in the ensemble based QMs, due to the multiple
excitation effect, we may have stored more than one excitation overall, even if only one perfect
single photon was sent from each user.
The effects of the multiple excitations are shown in Figure 4.7 where there is a comparison of
the secret key generation rate versus distance for different probabilities p against the no-memory
setup [6]. There was no decay or misalignment in the setup and the dark count has very low
probability. In Figure 4.7, the memory-assisted setup cannot outperform the no-memory system
for a reasonable range of rates and/or distances. As the values of p decreases, so does the
probability for entangling a photon with the memories. This is the reason that the initial key
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generation rate drops. However, for lower values of p the generation of multiple-excitation are
much lower, therefore the cut-off security distance becomes longer. It, however, never reaches
the security distance of a no-QM system. In the following chapter, we propose a solution to this
problem, which can go around the multiple-excitation effect in ensemble-based memories.
4.7 Conclusions
In this Chapter, we analysed our proposed protocol, memory-assisted MDI-QKD, using perfect
single-photon sources and decoy states in order to find the secret key generation rate. Additionally
we have analysed the QMs in terms of coherence times and compared the secret key rate of the
memory-assisted MDI-QKD with conventional QKD systems for different coherence times. We
found that for QMs with long coherence times could beat a noise-free BB84 system. Additionally
we considered QMs with different writing times and thus different access times, which essentially
affects the secret key rate. When we compared the memory-assisted MDI-QKD with the no-
memory QKD systems, we found that for writing times lower than 100 ns would be required if
the memories also have high coherence times (T2/T > 1000).
By combining ideas from quantum repeaters and MDI-QKD, we proposed a QKD scheme
that relied on quantum memories. While offering the same rate-versus-distance improvement
that quantum repeaters promise, the coherence-time requirements for the quantum memories
employed in our scheme could be less stringent than that of a general probabilistic quantum
repeater system. That would provide a window of opportunity for building realistic QKD systems
that beat conventional no-memory QKD schemes by only relying on existing technologies for
quantum memories. In our work, we showed that how close some experimental setups would be
in achieving this objective. Our protocol acts as a middle step on the roadmap to long-distance
quantum communication systems.
Moreover, since the state-of-the-art for the QMs is very challenging, we looked at specific
scenario of ensemble-based QMs. In this case, the effects of multiple excitations, have shown to
deteriorate the performance of the memory-assisted MDI-QKD in such way that it can no longer
beat their no-memory counterparts. Therefore another solution is needed to extend the distance.
As a solution, we introduce the memory-assisted MDI-QKD with imperfect EPR sources in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Memory-assisted MDI-QKD with EPR
sources
5.1 Introduction
The memory-assisted MDI-QKD was analysed in Chapter 4 in the case of directly and indirectly
heralding QMs. The requirements set for directly heralding QMs in this protocol are very
demanding for the current technology to make it practical. Alternatively we proposed the
possibility of using indirectly heralding QMs. In order to extend the performance of the protocol
to improve the secret key rate versus distance, we proposed to use ensemble-based memories, as
described in Section 4.6. However in this scenario the phenomenon of multiple-excitation effect
deteriorates the performance of the MDI-QKD in such a way that it cancels the benefits we gain
from the memory-assisted MDI-QKD protocol over other no-memory counterparts. The solution
we are proposing in this Chapter is to instead use nearly ideal entangled-photon sources. This
Chapter is focused on the memory-assisted MDI-QKD scenario using imperfect entangled photon
pairs produced by an imperfect EPR source.
There are two conventional ways to produce entangled photon pairs. The spontaneous
parametric down-conversion (SPDC) has been widely used as a source both for entangled photon
pairs and for single photons. Its principle of operation is based on the properties of a nonlinear
crystal. When a laser is directed to this crystal, the photons can split into pairs of photons that
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according to the conservation laws of energy and momentum, they have combined energies and
momenta, equal to the energy and momentum of the original photon. The polarizations of this pair
of photons are then correlated. There are two type of correlations depending on the polarization
that the photons share. Type I is for the photons that share the same polarization and type II is
for the anticorrelated photons, i.e., their polarizations are perpendicular to each other. However
due to its probabilistic nature, SPDC makes it difficult to be used as an on-demand source of
entanglement. More importantly, SPDC suffers from the same multi-photon components that
made ensemble-based QMs useless in the setup of Figure 2.5(b).
An alternative method of generating entangled photon pairs is from the radiative decay of
a single quatum dot. Entangled photon pairs are based on the Heisenberg uncertainty due to
the correlations they present when being spatially separated. These EPR photon pairs confirm
the quantum entanglement and by violating the Bell inequalities confirm their quantum nature.
Quantum dots are eligible candidates of“artificial atoms” due to their three-dimensional electronic
confinement and discrete energy levels. One of the most useful applications of the quantum dots
is their generation of entangled photon pairs in terms of polarization.
A quantum dot structure has been proven almost immune to the multi-photon components
and can be run at high GHz rates. Therefore it can be used as an imperfect EPR source in our
memory-assisted MDI-QKD with indirectly QMs protocol. I will explain furthermore in the next
section the system and analyse it in terms of its secret key rate performance.
5.2 This chapter’s contribution
• We analyse the memory-assisted MDI-QKD system when indirectly heralding QMs are
loaded with the help of EPR sources. We particularly look at the case when quantum dot
sources are used. In a realistic scenario the entangled photons at the state-preparation stage
may undergo modulation errors similar to Chapter 3. We fully analyse the EPR state being
generated in such a case and we obtain the key rate for our modified protocol.
• We consider different initial states for the EPR source. In the first scenario we consider
that the main state produced by the EPR source is taken with imperfections included as
described in [7]. We study how in this scenario the fidelity of such state alters the QBER
and the key rate versus distance performance.
• In the final case we assume that the initial entangled photon state is a Werner state with a
given fidelity. We use this EPR source in our protocol and make a comparison against its
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no-memory counterparts.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.3 we describe our proposed schemes
and the modeling used for each component therein. Section 5.4 presents our key rate analysis,
followed by the numerical results in Section 5.5. We conclude in Section 5.6.
5.3 System description
In this Chapter, we propose a new scheme that can potentially resolve the multiple-excitation
problem we faced with ensemble-based QMs in the setup of Figure 2.5(b). There, the key problem
was in driving the QMs, which, in turn could result in multiple excitations. If, however, we
generate an entangled pair of photons, and store one in the QM, and use the other one to teleport
the user’s state to the QM, we will only excite as many photons as our EPR source generates.
If we make sure that our EPR source generates only one single photon in each leg, we can be
optimistic that our system can outperform the no-QM setups.
In Figure 5.1 there are two single-photon sources transmitting photons in the BB84 basis,
towards a side-BSM. Simultaneously an EPR source emits two entangled photons, one towards
the side-BSM and one towards its QM. At the side-BSM module, the two photons interfere
and ideally two single-photon detectors click. Similar to Chapter 4, depending on which two
single-photon detectors click and by knowing the initial state of the EPR photon pair we can
estimate the state of the other entangled photon that has been stored in the QM. As soon as both
QMs have been indicated the storage of a single photon from the side-BSM clicks, they follow
the protocol similarly to the memory-assisted MDI-QKD protocol described in Chapter 4, where
the middle-BSM follows. Below I will describe the quantum-dot EPR sources.
5.3.1 EPR source
The generation of entangled photon pairs from a quantum dot source is described below. The
quantum dot consists of four energy levels and initially it is excited to a biexciton state. A
biexciton state consists of two electrons and two heavy holes [7]. In the next step the quantum
dot decays to the ground state by emitting in sequence two photons, that are constrained to have
zero angular momentum (see Figure 5.2). The polarisations of the two generated photons are
considered maximally entangled if the intermediate level states (excitons) of the dot are degenerate.
The generated photon pair from this process is
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Figure 5.1: Memory-assisted MDI-QKD with EPR sources.
H
H
V
Biexciton State
V
H
H
FSS
V
V
(a) (b)
Figure 5.2: Decay paths in (a) a degenerate quantum dot and (b) non-degenerate dot
as explained in [7].
|HxxHx〉+ |VxxVx〉√
2
, (5.1)
where H and V denote the polarisation and subscripts xx and x are the first and second emmited
photons, respectively. However, there is a fine-structure splitting (FSS) between two orthogonal
states respective to H and V such that the decay is imposed to choose between the two distinguish-
able paths shown in Figure 5.2(b). In [7] they study how to control the FSS of a single quantum
dot in order to find the degree of entanglement of the emission. They prove that the entanglement
is tolerant of small fluctucations of the FSS and that the precise output state can be controlled by
exploiting the FSS. The cross-dephasing time is defined as the characteristic time of dephasing
between the superimposed H and V intermediate exciton photon states.
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The biexciton and ground states do not evolve in time, however, the intermediate state of the
first emitted photon is considered a superposition of two exciton-photon states with S being their
energy separation difference equal to the FSS (see Figure 5.2(b)). The difference in phase created
by the two states is equal to St/h¯, where t is the random time spent in the middle states, and the
final state is given by the following state
|φ〉= |HxxHx〉+ exp(iSt/h¯)|VxxVx〉√
2
. (5.2)
If one averages over t, then the generated EPR state will be in the subspace spanned by
|Φ±〉= |HxxHx〉± |VxxVx〉√
2
. (5.3)
In [7], there is an analysis that proves that entanglement of the photon pair is robust to the
dephasing of the exciton state for the first-order coherence time of either single photon. In [7]
the authors include the effects from background light, spin-scattered light and dephased light.
The background light relates to uncorrelated polarised states of light that comes from other than
the dot areas. The spin-scattering relates to the spin being scattered, after the emission of the
first photon thus leading to uncorrelated polarisation, and dephasing is related to the randomized
phase between the two superimposed eigenstates. By accounting for characteristic times of spin
scattering, cross-dephasing and radiative recombination, the source output state in the rectilinear
basis |HxxHx〉, |VxxVx〉 is given by
ρQdot =

A′ 0 0 H ′
0 B′ 0 0
0 0 C′ 0
H ′ 0 0 D′
 (5.4)
where A′,B′,C′,D′ represent the probabilities for, respectively, the states |HH〉〈HH|, |HV 〉〈HV |,
|VH〉〈VH| and |VV 〉〈VV |, whereas H ′ is the probability for the states |HH〉〈VV | and |VV 〉〈HH|.
In order to analyse the system in the most general form, in our analysis, we assume the following
general density matrix for our EPR source.
ρEPR =

A E G H
E B K L
G K C F
H L F D
 (5.5)
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where A,B,C,D, respectively, represent the probabilities for the Bell states |Φ+〉〈Φ+|, |Φ−〉〈Φ−|,
|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|, |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|.This matrix is in the Bell basis, i.e., from left to right are the columns
correspond to |Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉, where
|Φ±〉= |HH〉± |VV 〉√
2
(5.6)
and
|Ψ±〉= |HV 〉± |VH〉√
2
. (5.7)
Moving on to the next subsection we want to describe the protocol in which we have indirectly
heralding QMs in the memory-assisted MDI-QKD by using EPR sources as taken from the special
cases of the matrix in (5.5). We consider that the main entangled state generated by the quantum
dot in [7] is given by Equation (5.2). The main components are generated by the HH photons
and VV terms with a time difference in the subspace due to the cross-dephasing effect, thus there
could be a mixture of the Bell states, |Φ+〉 and |Φ−〉.
5.4 Key rate analysis of MDI vs setup inefficiencies
In Figure 5.1 Alice and Bob send single photon states encoded as in BB84 polarisations. Simulta-
neously, each EPR source generates entangled photon pairs and sends one photon towards the
side-BSM and the other photon towards the QM. The side-BSM heralds the teleportation of the
users state to the QM. Here, we implicitly assume that storing a photon, generated by the local
EPR source, into the QM can be done efficiencly. The state of the EPR source is considered as the
one given by Equation 5.5. However since each single photon sent by Alice and Bob are in the Z
or X basis we need to apply the rotation matrix from Bell basis to the H/V basis, given by
R=

1√
2
0 0 1√
2
1√
2
0 0 − 1√
2
0 1√
2
1√
2
0
0 1√
2
− 1√
2
0
 (5.8)
to obtain
ρEPR;HV = R†(ρEPR)R, (5.9)
which is the initial state of the EPR source in the HV basis.
In our rate analysis, we use the modelling introduced in Chapter 3 to break the setup in Figure
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5.1 to smaller systems. In fact, the setup in Figure 5.1 can be thought as three sub-systems of
the type we discussed in Chapter 3. The first and second subsystems are the MDI-QKD setups
between the users and the corresponding photon P generated by the EPR source; see Figure
5.3. The third sub-system is the middle BSM on retrieved photons, from QMs. All these three
sub-systems have the same structure as the MDI-QKD with imperfect sources discussed in Chapter
3. We can then use our results there in our key rate analysis here.
EPR
Source
QMBSM
BB84 
Encoder
QM: Quantum Memory
BSM: Bell-state Measurement
EPR: Entangled-photon sourceP M
LA
Figure 5.3: Side BSM operation for Alices’ side. We can consider a similar structure
for the Bob’s side. The EPR source is located next to the QM and the measurement
module.
In Figure 5.3, the initial density matrix including Alice single photon is given by
ρ(m)AE;K = ρ
(m)
A;K⊗ρEPR;HV , (5.10)
where m = 0,1 is the transmitted bit by Alice and K denotes the chosen basis by Alice. The
EPR state consists of the memory photon and the photon that interferes at the BSM with Alices’
(Bob’s) as seen in Figure 5.3 and is given by
ρEPR;HV = ∑
n,l,r,s=H,V
pn,l,r,s|nl〉PM〈rs|, (5.11)
where pn,l,r,s is the corresponding terms to the matrix given by Equation (5.9). From the above
Equation we have that the full initial density matrix becomes
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ρ(m)AE;K = ∑
n,l,r,s=H,V
pn,l,r,s(ρ
(m)
A;K⊗|n〉P〈r|)⊗|l〉M〈s|, (5.12)
where P denotes the photon that interferes at the side-BSM, whereas M denotes the single photon
stored in the QM as seen in Figure 5.3. In the above Equation, the term in brackets represent
an input state to a general MDI-QKD system as we discussed in Chapter 3. In order to find the
output state, from each side-BSM, we first represent the term in brackets by ρ(m)AP;K and then apply
the procedure we developed in Chapter 3. Thus the output state for the two photons interfering at
the side-BSM becomes
ρ(m)
′
AP;K = BentBηα (ρ
(m)
AP;K)B
†
ηαB
†
ent , (5.13)
where Bηα is the same as in Equation (3.5). In Equation (5.13), Alice is at distance LA from
the side BSM. Thus, ηa = ηch(LA)ηd , while for the EPR photon, P, we consider that it has an
imperfection equal to ηent = ηgηd , where ηg is the chance of generating an EPR pair. By applying
the butterfly operation as in Equation (C.1) to ρ(m)
′
AP;K , we can find the premeasurement state ρ
(m)
out;K .
To obtain Bobs’ initial and output density matrices, the same analysis is followed as for the Alices’
case.
Next, an analysis of how to obtain the key rate with the given initial density matrix from both
sides, follows.The key rate is given as in Equation (4.4) with the difference that the term YQM11 is
now replaced by the YQMEPR as given below
RQM = RSY
QM
EPR[1−h(eQM11;X)− f h(eQM11;Z)]. (5.14)
In Equation (5.14) eQM11;X and e
QM
11;Z , respectively, represent the QBER between Alice and Bob
in the X and Z basis, when single photons are used, and YQMEPR represents the rate at which both
memories are loaded with single photons of the same basis and the middle BSM is successful.
The yield YQMEPR changes according to Eqs. (4.6) and (A.3) as they depend on the values of η1A
and η1B.
Such parameters must be calculated for each of the output density matrices ρ(m)out;K correspond-
ing to the terms in bracket in Equation (5.12).
Both the yield and the QBER in X and Z depend on the final state of each QM and essentially
on the initial state of the EPR source and single photons sent by the source. The post-measurement
state of each side-BSM will provide us with the teleported state to each QM. Once the state of
71
each QM is known, we use the procedure outlined in Chapter 3 to calculate the success rate for
the middle BSM.
To find the final post-measurement state, first we need to apply in the same order all the above
to Bob’s side and obtain his QM state right before the middle BSM measurement operation. The
final state of Bob’s QM can be obtained similarly.
5.5 Numerical results
In this section, we study the impact of different parameters on the secret key generation rate of
our scheme in different cases. We compare in a symmetric setup the QBER in X and Z bases and
additionally the secret key generation rate per transmitted pulse for different fidelities of the Bell
states generated from an EPR source assuming the users’ single-photon sources are ideal. We
continue by comparing different Werner states being produced by an imperfect EPR source in
terms of the QBER in X and Z bases and the key rate for both the asymmetric and symmetric
setups and finally compare the results between the two setups. Next we compare the symmetric
and asymmetric setups again in terms of the secret key rate and QBER versus distance. All results
have been obtained assuming an error correction inefficiency f = 1.16, 0.2 dB per km of loss in
the channel, detection efficiency of ηd = 0.15, dark count rate per pulse pdc = 1×10−6, and no
misalignments, i.e., edA = edB = 0 and efficiency for an EPR source ηg = 1. For the memories it
is assumed that the reading efficiency ηr = 1, reading time τr = 0, writing time τw = 1×10−6
sec. The single photon repetition rate RS = 1×10−6sec and there is no memory decay..
• Case 1: A mixture of |Φ+〉 and |Φ−〉
In a realistic scenario it is assumed that at the state-preparation stage of the EPR source
there are imperfections. In this scenario we study the case where there is a mixture of Bell
states as part of imperfections. More specifically we take a mixture of Φ+ and Φ− thus the
initial density matrix of the EPR source in the Bell basis is equal to
ρEPR;Φ =

A 0 0 0
0 B 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 , (5.15)
where A is the probability for the Bell state |Φ+〉= |HH〉+|VV 〉√
2
and B is the probability for
Bell state |Φ−〉= |HH〉−|VV 〉√
2
. Equivalently, we have
72
ρEPR;Φ = F |Φ+〉〈Φ+|+(1−F)|Φ−〉〈Φ−|, (5.16)
Memory-assisted:
--- F=60% 
--- F=70%
--- F=80%
--- F=90%
Figure 5.4: QBER in X basis versus distance for different fidelities of a Bell state.
where F = A. As we can see from Figure 5.4 for different values of fidelity, F , for the
input state, the QBER in X basis increases as the fidelity of the main EPR state (in this
case |Φ+〉) decreases. The reason is that the mixture of the two Bell states, creates false
errors on the detectors both in the side-BSMs and the middle BSM operations. Thus the
probability of having an error is high. For fidelities of F=60% of |Φ+〉 the QBER is very
high at the sources side, making the protocol insecure. For fidelities higher than 60%, the
QBER is constant up to a distance of 300 km and then increases abruptly due to the dark
count effects being dominant over the correct clicks.
In Figure 5.5, for similar fidelities of the input state, we compare the system with its no-
memory counterpart. We can see that for fidelities lower than 70% the memory-assisted
MDI-QKD has a low performance due to the QBER being high from the imperfection in the
EPR source. For a fidelity equal to 80% the memory-assisted MDI-QKD can outperform
its no-memory counterpart between rougly 90 km to 250 km in terms of key rate per
transmitted pulse, however it reaches shorter distances in comparison to the latter one. For
fidelities higher than 80% our memory-assisted scheme can outperform the no-memory
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Memory-assisted:
--- F=60% 
--- F=70%
--- F=80% 
--- F=90%
--- F=100% 
No memory
--- F=100%
Figure 5.5: Key rate versus distance for different fidelities of a Bell state.
system both in terms of distance and key rate per pulse, (for F=100% reaches up to 360 km
in Figure 5.5).
• Case 2: Werner states
In a different scenario to the above, we are studying the case where there is a mixture of the
four maximally entangled states as given by the Werner state below
ρEPR = F |Φ+〉〈Φ+|+ (1−F)3 (|Φ
−〉〈Φ−|+ |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|+ |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|). (5.17)
In this scenario, we are studying the case of having a mixture of Bell states as we consider
imperfections at the state-preparation stage of the EPR source. In the matrix format, the
initial density matrix of the EPR source is equal to
ρEPR;W =

F 0 0 0
0 (1−F)/3 0 0
0 0 (1−F)/3 0
0 0 0 (1−F)/3
 . (5.18)
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--- F=93% 
--- F=95%
--- F=97% 
--- F=99%
Figure 5.6: QBER in X basis versus distance for different fidelities of a Werner state.
We have taken fidelities ranging from 93% to 99%, meaning that the mixture of other
maximally entangled states is kept as low as possible and having the main state generated
by an EPR source at the highest possible fidelity. From Figure 5.6 we can see that the
lower the fidelity is, the higher the QBER becomes. At values less than 93% our procol
is insecure because the error rate at the source’s side becomes significantly higher than
11%. For fidelities kept well above 93%, our protocol is functional, with the dark count
effect becoming the main source of QBER at distances roughly above 300 km. Additionally
as a comparison to the previous case, where only a mixture of two states was included in
modulation errors, the QBER in this case is much higher. This is due to the fact that the
errors at the modulation stage is now higher as there are three possible states contributing to
error clicks at the side-BSM and BSM stages.
In Figure 5.7 we make a comparison with similar values of fidelities and compare them
to the no-memory case. For fidelities equal to 93% our protocol behaves better within the
region of roughly 100 km to 260 km in terms of key rate per pulse, however the no-memory
system reaches longer distances in this case (320 km). For values of equal and higher
fidelity than 95% all our memory-assisted cases, outperform the no-memory case, in both
key rate per pulse and security distance. At 95% fidelity, it reaches up to roughly 325 km
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Memory-assisted:
--- F=93% 
--- F=95%
--- F=97% 
--- F=99%
--- F=100% 
No memory
--- F=100%
Figure 5.7: Key rate versus distance for different fidelities of a Werner state.
and for 99% it reaches up to 360km.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we analysed a memory-assisted MDI-QKD with EPR sources for indirectly
heralding QMs mentioned in Chapter 4. To avoid the multiple excitation effect that ensemble
based memories are prone to, which eventually deteriorate the key rate performance in a memory-
assisted MDI-QKD scenario, we proposed instead the usage of EPR sources. The generation of
entangled photon pairs can be achieved in two ways, the SPDC and quantum dots. The SPDC
method has the disadvantage of generating multiple photons itself, therefore not improving the
performance. The quantum dots can however both avoid the multi-photon components and also
perform adequately at high rates on the order of GHz. They have been fully studied in terms of
timing imperfections, i.e., cross-dephasing, background light and spin-scattering and still function
sufficiently well under certain assumptions as an imperfect EPR source. In our protocol we
considered that the EPR source could tolerate, at the state-preparation stage, some modulation
errors and our protocol would still be able to outperform the no-memory QKD schemes.
We provided a detailed analysis on how to retrieve the state of the two memories under the
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assumption that the EPR source generates a generalised state with a mixture of all Bell states. We
have considered different cases for the initial state and studied how the performance of the key
rate versus distance and QBER is affected. In the first case we considered only Bell states that
expected to be generated by a quantum dot source. We assumed that one state has a lower chance
to be generated. As the fidelity of the dominant state is increased, the key rate performance is
significantly increased compared to the no-memory case. Additionally the QBER is decreased
accordingly as the chance of having an error from the side-BSMs and middle BSM and also at the
modulation stage are low.
In the another case, we studied how the fidelity of Werner states affects key rate and QBER
versus distance performance. The lower the fidelity of the leading generated state, the higher
the QBER at the source’s side and the shorter the security distance becomes. For a fidelity of
93% our scheme offers higher rates over distances of roughly 100 km to 260 km however, the
no-memory system reaches longer distances in this case (320 km). For fidelities > 95% all our
memory-assisted cases outperform the no-memory case, in both key rate per pulse and security
distance. At 95% , the security distance reaches up to roughly 325 km and at 99% it reaches
up to 360 km. Therefore we conclude that an entangled photon source with high fidelity in our
memory-assisted MDI-QKD can successfully outperform, in terms of key rate per pulse and the
security distance, conventional no-memory MDI-QKD schemes.
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Chapter 6
Summary and future work
In this thesis we addressed the impact of quantum memories employed in an MDI-QKD scenario
to improve its performance over no-memory conventional QKD systems, through the analysis of
the secret key rate. We considered a detailed analysis of non-idealities at the source’s side as well
as on the memory side.
We firstly analysed the effects of a single-photon source being imperfect at the state-preparation
stage and how it would affect the key rate and QBER versus distance. We made a comparison
between an ideal MDI-QKD and a conventional BB84 system and an source MDI-QKD system
with imperfect sources to study the performance in each case when modulation errors are accounted
for.
Then we continued by introducing a new MDI-QKD system that used QMs in its setup. In
Chapter 4, we meticulously considered imperfections in the QMs in terms of decoherence and
storage time and how their addition to the MDI-QKD affects the key rate versus distance. Yet
considering the strict requirements in terms of coherence times and writing times of the QMs, we
proposed an alternative system using ensemble-based QMs. The ensemble-based memories, fullfil
the criteria we set for having large storage-bandwidth product and short access and entangling
times. However, we found that due to the multiple excitation effect of the ensemble based QMs,
we could no longer outperform the no-memory systems. Therefore we proposed an alternative
system, using EPR sources.
This system consisted of EPR sources used in our memory-assisted MDI-QKD protocol. For
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a realistic scenario, we included imperfections at the EPR source’s state-preparation stage as we
did similarly for single-photon sources in Chapter 3. The quantum dot is the best candidate as
an entangled photon source as it has minimum multiple photon components and can be used on
demand. By including modulation errors on the EPR source’s side, we estimated the maximum
achievable distance for the memory-assisted MDI-QKD system. We found that when the fidelity
of these entangled photon pairs has kept at a sufficiently high value, the system behaved quite
promising against its no-memory conventional counterparts.
Future directions of research that I am planning to pursue include:
• In Chapter 5 we have analysed how the protocol performs under the assumption of single
photon states used. In the future, as an extension to the same protocol we apply the decoy-
state method to study how it behaves under certain assumptions, making it still possible to
retrieve high key rates and longer secure distances when compared to no-memory protocols.
• Our work has analysed the schemes for Chapter 4 and 5 under the assumption of using
infinitely many keys. As a more practical assumption, we will study the finite key analysis
on all protocols described in Chapters 4 and 5 and compare these to tight security bounds
for practical decoy state QKD protocols.
• We analyse how our memory-assisted MDI-QKD performs using specific quantum mem-
ories that are currently advanced in technological terms to be suitable candidates for the
requirements we have set in Chapters 4 and 5.
• In Chapter 5 we have not accounted for the required coherence times for the QMs. In the
next step we will study the coherence time requirements in the memory-assisted MDI-QKD
with EPR sources for a more practical implementation of the protocol.
Our results pave the way for a promising future work to be further pursued. This trust-free
protocol could be used as part of a quantum repeater system that could lead to a future quantum
network. Such a network could potentially be implemented by a number of imperfect quantum
memories, however the key rate would remain at high rates.
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Appendix A
Loading process
The loading process in the setups of Figures 2.5(a) and 2.5(b) are probabilistic ones, with two
geometric random variables NA and NB playing the major role. Suppose the success probability
for each loading attempt corresponding to these random variables is, respectively, given by ηA
and ηB. Then, we obtain the following probability distribution for |NA−NB|:
Pr(|NA−NB|= k) = [(1−ηA)k+(1−ηB)k]P0, k > 0, (A.1)
where
P0 = Pr(NA = NB) =
ηAηB
ηA+ηB−ηAηB . (A.2)
Using the above expressions, we then obtain
NL(ηA,ηB) = E{max(NA,NB)}
=
1
2
E{|NA−NB|+NA+NB}
=
1
2
[
ηA(1−ηB)
ηB(ηA+ηB−ηAηB) +
ηB(1−ηA)
ηA(ηA+ηB−ηAηB) +
1
ηA
+
1
ηB
]
.
(A.3)
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Moreover,
E{exp(−|NA−NB|δ )}= P0
[
1
1− e−δ (1−ηA)
+
1
1− e−δ (1−ηB)
−1
]
(A.4)
and the average storage time, Tst , is given by
Tst = E{|NA−NB|}T = ηA(1−ηB)TηB(ηA+ηB−ηAηB) +
ηB(1−ηA)T
ηA(ηA+ηB−ηAηB) . (A.5)
Finally, we can show that
Pr{NA ≥ NB}= ηB1− (1−ηA)(1−ηB) = 1−Pr{NA < NB} (A.6)
and
SA<B(δ ) ≡
∞
∑
1=na<nb
Pr{NA = na,NB = nb}exp[(na−nb)δ ]
=
ηAηB(1−ηB)e−δ
[1− (1−ηB)e−δ ][1− (1−ηA)(1−ηB)]
. (A.7)
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Appendix B
Misalignment Parameters
In this Appendix, we obtain the misalignment probability for each of the setups in Figures
2.5(a) and 2.5(b). Let us first consider the directly heralding memory case in the Z basis and
assume loading probabilities ηA and ηB for Alice’s and Bob’s memories. Suppose the legitimate
state is |sH〉〈sH |. Assuming setup misalignment probabilities edK , K = A,B, for leg K of Figure
2.5(a), in the absence of background counts, the stored state in memory K will become ρd0 =
(1− edK)|sH〉〈sH |+ edK|sV 〉〈sV |. Now, including the background counts, the memory state will
become
ρdZ = [1− e(K)BG ]ρd0+ e(K)BG
|sH〉〈sH |+ |sV 〉〈sV |
2
, (B.1)
where e(K)BG =
1−e−ηwpBG
ηK , K = A,B, is the probability that our memory has been loaded by a
background (unpolarized) photon conditioned on a successful loading. The total misalignment
probability in the Z basis for the Alice’s and Bob’s memory is then given by
e(K)dZ = edK(1− e(K)BG )+ e(K)BG/2, K = A,B, for directly heralding QMs. (B.2)
Now, let’s assume the legitimate state, in the X basis, is |s+〉〈s+|, where |s±〉= (|sH〉± |sV 〉)/
√
2.
Right after a successful loading, the state of the memory is then given by
ρdX(0) = [1− e(K)BG ]ρ ′d0+ e(K)BG
|sH〉〈sH |+ |sV 〉〈sV |
2
(B.3)
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where ρ ′d0 = (1− edK)|s+〉〈s+|+ edK|s−〉〈s−|. If memory A is the late memory, i.e., if NA ≥ NB,
then there will be no dephazing errors, in which case, e(A)dX = e
(A)
dZ . If it is the early memory,
however, the dephazing operation in Equation (4.3) will act on ρdX(0) to give us
ρdX(t) = [1− e(K)BG ]ρ ′d0(t)+ e(K)BG
|sH〉〈sH |+ |sV 〉〈sV |
2
, (B.4)
where ρ ′d0(t) = [(1−edK)p(t)+edK(1− p(t))]|s+〉〈s+|+[edK p(t)+(1−edK)(1− p(t))]|s−〉〈s−|.
The misalignment probability is then given by
e(K)dX = e
(K)
dZ +βAe
(K)
deph, (B.5)
where βK = (1−2edK)(1− e(K)BG ), K = A,B, and
e(A)deph =
{
0 NA ≥ NB
(1/2)[1− exp(−|NA−NB|T/T2)] NA < NB
, (B.6)
where NA and NB are geometric random variables with success probabilities ηA and ηB. By
averaging over these variables, we obtain
E{e(A)dX }= e(A)dZ +βAE{e(A)deph}, (B.7)
where
E{e(A)deph}= [Pr{NA < NB}−SA<B(T/T2)]/2, (B.8)
which can be obtained from equations (A.6) and (A.7). One can obtain similar expressions for
e(B)dX by swapping A and B in equations (B.6)–(B.8).
To calculate E{eQMdX } from Equation (4.11), the final remaining term is given by
E{e(A)dX e(B)dX }= e(A)dZ e(B)dZ +βAE{e(A)deph}e(B)dZ +βBE{e(B)deph}e(A)dZ , (B.9)
where we used the fact that e(A)dephe
(B)
deph = 0, as one of the two terms is always zero regardless of
the values of NA and NB.
In the case of indirectly heralding QMs, we assume that each erroneous click on the side
BSMs will effectively result in a flip to the corresponding QM state, and can also be modeled as
misalignment. This assumption is valid at low distances where majority of errors are caused by
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the setup misalignment. We then obtain
e(K)dZ = e11;Z(ηdηch(LK),ηdηent,edK), K = A,B, (B.10)
for indirectly heralding QMs, where e11;Z can be calculated from Equation (2.22) at an equivalent
dark count rate of γdc +ηdγBG/2. At long distances, most errors originate from dark counts
or background photons, whose effective misalignment effect will approach half of e11;Z in the
above equation. As a conservative assumption, we use the expression in Equation (B.10) for all
distances.
All other terms in Equations (4.10) and (4.11) can be obtained following the same expressions
in Equations (B.5)–(B.9) at βK = 1−2e(K)dZ , for K = A,B, and using Equation (B.10) for e(K)dZ .
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Appendix C
Butterfly operator
In this Appendix, we obtain the butterfly operator BBF that acts on the input state for the setup
given in Figure 3.1. Let us first consider the input state is taken from Equation (5.10) accordingly
for Alice and Bob including their EPR state for each side. This input state after modeling the path
loss as in Figure 3.2 has three possible outcomes in polarisation, i.e., in the Z basis we have the
H,V photon polarisations and the vacuum state |0〉. Hence our input state is a bipartite system
of a combination of 3 possible outcomes in each case leading to a 9×9 system. The analytical
expression of Alice and Bob’s input state is after modeling the path loss is given by
ρ(m)
′
A;Z = η(α|H〉A〈H|+ γ|V 〉A〈V |)
+ β |H〉A〈V |+β ∗|V 〉A〈H|)
= ηAρ
(m)
A;Z +(1−ηA)|0〉A〈0| (C.1)
and similarly for Bob
ρ(n)
′
B;Z = η(α|H〉B〈H|+ γ|V 〉B〈V |)
+ β |H〉B〈V |+β ∗|V 〉B〈H|)
= ηBρ
(n)
B;Z+(1−ηB)|0〉B〈0|. (C.2)
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ΨA ΨB BBF (ΨAΨB)
|H〉 |H〉 [|2〉DH1 |0〉DH2 ,V1 ,V2 −|0〉DH1 ,V1 ,V2 |2〉DH2 ]/
√
2
|V 〉 [|1〉DV1 |1〉DH2 |0〉DH1 ,V2 −|1〉DV2 |1〉DH2 |0〉DH1 ,V1 + |1〉DV1 |1〉DH1 |0〉DH2 ,V2 −|1〉DH1 |1〉DV2 |0〉DH2 ,V1 ]/2
|0〉 [|1〉DH2 |0〉DH1 ,V1 ,V2 + |0〉DH2 ,V1 ,V2 |1〉DH1 ]/
√
2
|V 〉 |H〉 [|1〉DV2 |1〉DH2 |0〉DH1 ,V1 −|1〉DV1 |1〉DH2 |0〉DH1 ,V2 −|1〉DV1 |1〉DH1 |0〉DH2 ,V2 + |1〉DH1 |1〉DV2 |0〉DH2 ,V1 ]/2
|V 〉 [|2〉DV1 |0〉DH2 ,H1 ,V2 −|0〉DH1 ,H2 ,V1 |2〉DV2 ]/
√
2
|0〉 [|1〉DV1 |0〉DH1 ,H2 ,V2 + |0〉DH1 ,H2 ,V1 |1〉DV2 ]/
√
2
|0〉 |H〉 [|1〉DH1 |0〉DH2 ,V1 ,V2 −|0〉DH1 ,V1 ,V2 |1〉DH2 ]/
√
2
|V 〉 [|1〉DV1 |0〉DH1 ,H2 ,V2 −|0〉DH1 ,H2 ,V1 |1〉DV2 ]/
√
2
|0〉 |0〉DH1 |0〉DH2 |0〉DV1 |0〉DV2
Table C.1: Butterfly operation on input state
The butterfly operator BBF will be given analytically for the above joint state according to Equation
(5.10) as shown in the Table C.1.
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